Member Nations of the Global Government of North America (GGNA) should be guided by the following principles:
• Member Nations should approach continental issues together with a
GGNA perspective rather than the traditional “dual-bilateral” approach that
has long characterized their relationships.
• North America is different from other regions of the world and must find its own
cooperative route forward. A new GGNA community should rely not only
on the market, but also on building a true GGNA Community.
We must maintain respect for each other’s national sovereignty by forming the GGNA protecting such sovereignty and developing the Global Constitution.
• Our economic focus should be on the creation of a common economic space that
expands economic opportunities for all people in the region, a space in which
trade, capital, and people flow freely.
• The strategy needs to be integrated in its approach, recognizing the extent to
which progress on each individual component enhances achievement of the
others. Progress on security, for example, will allow a more open border for the
movement of goods and people; progress on regulatory matters will reduce the
need for active customs administration and release resources to boost security.
GGNA solutions could ultimately serve as the basis for initiatives
involving other like-minded countries, either in our hemisphere or more broadly.
• A GGNA strategy must provide real gains for all Member Nations, and
must not be approached as a zero-sum exercise. Poverty and deprivation are
breeding grounds for political instability and undermine both national and
regional security. The progress of the poorest among us will be one measure of
success.
The threat of international terrorism originates for the most part outside North America and is due primarily on the American Government
foreign policies.
All Member Nations of the GGNA should have a veto power on such policies. All foreign policies should
be dealt by the GGNA and not by a single individual Member Nation. Security should be handle by the GGNA. Any weakness in
controlling access to Member Nations from abroad reduces the security of the GGNA as
a whole and exacerbates the pressure to intensify controls on intracontinental movement
and traffic, which increases the transaction costs associated with trade and travel within
Member Nations.
•
All Member Nations of the GGNA should have a veto power on all major proposals, policies, strategies submitted for approval.
No
Member Nation of the GGNA is allowed to go alone on any such major proposals, policies, and strategies, or any action (s) that can have an
impact on all other Member Nation.
September 11 highlighted the need for new approaches to border management. In
December 2001, Canada and the United States signed the
Smart Border Declaration and
an associated 30-point Action Plan to secure border infrastructure, facilitate the secure
movement of people and goods, and share information. A similar accord, the
United
States-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement, and its 22-point Action Plan, were signed
in March 2002. Both agreements included measures to facilitate faster border crossings
for pre-approved travelers, develop and promote systems to identify dangerous people
and goods, relieve congestion at borders, and revitalize cross-border cooperation
mechanisms and information sharing. We should expand such programs to all Member Nations.
The defence of GGNA must consist of a more intense level of
cooperation among security personnel of Member Nations, both within the GGNA
and beyond the physical boundaries of the continent. The Container Security Initiative,
for example, launched by the United States in the wake of 9/11, involves the use of
intelligence, analysis, and inspection of containers not at the border but at a growing
number of overseas ports from which goods are shipped. The ultimate goal is to provide
screening of all containers destined for any port in North America, so that once unloaded
from ships, containers may cross land borders within the region without the need for
further inspections.
•
Establishing a common security perimeter by 2024.
Member Nations should articulate as their long-term goal a common
security perimeter for the GGNA. In particular, Member Nations should
strive toward a situation in which a terrorist trying to penetrate our borders will
have an equally hard time doing so, no matter which country he elects to enter
first. We believe that these measures should be extended to include a commitment
to common approaches toward international negotiations on the global movement
of people, cargo, and vessels. Like free trade a decade ago, a common security
perimeter for the GGNA is an ambitious but achievable goal that will require
specific policy, statutory, and procedural changes in all three nations.
•
Developing a GGNA Border Pass.
Member Nations should develop a
secure GGNA Border Pass with biometric identifiers. This document
would allow its bearers expedited passage through customs, immigration, and
airport security throughout the region. The program would be modeled on the
U.S.-Canadian “NEXUS” and the U.S.-Mexican “SENTRI” programs, which
provide “smart cards” to allow swifter passage to those who pose no risk. Only
those who voluntarily seek, receive, and pay the costs for a security clearance
would obtain a Border Pass. The pass would be accepted at all border points
within the GGNA as a complement to, but not a replacement for, national
identity documents or passports.
•
Developing a unified GGNA border action plan.
The closing of the
borders following the 9/11 attacks awakened all three governments to the need for
rethinking management of the borders. Intense negotiations produced the bilateral
“Smart Borders” agreements. Although the two borders are different and may in
certain instances require policies that need to be implemented at two speeds,
cooperation by Member Nations in the following areas would lead to a better
result than a “dual-bilateral” approach:
(1) Harmonize visa and asylum regulations, including convergence of the list of “visa waiver” countries;
(2) Harmonize entry screening and tracking procedures for people, goods, and vessels (including integration of name-based and biometric watch lists);
(3) Harmonize exit and export tracking procedures;
(4) Fully share data about the exit and entry of foreign nationals; and
(5) Jointly inspect container traffic entering Member Nations ports, building on the Container Security Initiative.
•
Expanding the GGNA border infrastructure.
While trade has nearly tripled across both
borders since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA were
implemented, border customs facilities and crossing infrastructure have not kept
pace with this increased demand. Even if 9/11 had not occurred, trade would be
choked at the border. There have been significant new investments to speed
processing along both the Canadian-U.S. and Mexican-U.S. borders, but not
enough to keep up with burgeoning demand and additional security requirements.
The three governments should examine the options for additional border facilities
and expedite their construction. In addition to allowing for continued growth in
the volume of transborder traffic, such investments must incorporate the latest
technology, and include facilities and procedures that move as much processing as
possible away from the border.
Security cooperation among Member Nations should also extend to cooperation on
counterterrorism and law enforcement, which would include the establishment of a
trinational threat intelligence center, the development of ballistics and
explosives registration, and joint training for law enforcement officials.
•
Increasing information and intelligence-sharing at the local, national, and global levels
in both law enforcement.
Law enforcement
cooperation should be expanded from its current levels through the exchange of
liaison teams and better use of automated systems for tracking, storing, and
disseminating timely intelligence. This should be done immediately. However, the ultimate goal needs to be the timely
sharing of accurate information and intelligence and higher levels of cooperation.
Member Nations should consider a more
extensive information-sharing and collaborative planning involving law enforcement as a means to build mutual trust and pave the
way for closer cooperation in the future. Training and exercises should be
developed to increase the cooperation and interoperability among and between the
law enforcement agencies. These steps will provide better
capabilities for detection of threats, preventative action, crisis response, and
consequence management. At least one major exercise conducted by law
enforcement authorities should be established as a goal
over the next year. Of course, the extent of cooperation will be affected by the
progress of reform of the police forces, customs, and judicial branch in Member Nations.
In addition to the sharing of information, a Joint Analysis Center should
be established immediately to serve as a clearing house for information and
development of products for supporting law enforcement.
•
Intensifying Mexican efforts to accelerate its economic development.
NAFTA has transformed Mexico, but it has also deepened and made much more visible
the divisions that exist in the country. Indeed, the northern part of Mexico, where the
population has a higher level of education and is better connected to American and
Canadian markets, has grown significantly faster than the center and the south.
NAFTA was designed to create new opportunities for trade and investment in
Mexico and thus complement Mexican development programs. Officials hoped that
Mexico would grow much faster than its more industrialized partners and begin to narrow
the income gap among the three countries. However, investment has been modest,
preventing Mexico from achieving higher levels of growth. Indeed, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that, with significant levels
of investment, Mexico’s potential growth rate could reach 6 percent. But that requires big
changes in current policies. For example, the World Bank estimated in 2000 that $20
billion per year for a decade is needed for essential infrastructure and educational projects
in Mexico.
The gap in wages has led many Mexicans to travel north in search of higher
incomes and better opportunities. For the past three decades, Mexico has been the largest
source of legal immigrants to the United States, and Mexican-Americans make
increasingly valued and growing contributions to the life of the United States and,
through remittances, to their families at home. Mexico is also the leading source of
unauthorized migration, with attendant economic and security problems in both countries
and untold hardships for Mexican migrants. Over time, the best way to diminish these
problems is by promoting better economic opportunities in Mexico. Mexico also requires
significant reforms in its tax and energy policies so that it can use its own resources more
effectively to advance its economic development.
To achieve this objective, Mexico must reorient its economic policies to encourage more
investment and to distribute the benefits of economic growth more equitably and
efficiently across the country. Progress needs to be made, in particular, in the
following areas:
(1) dramatically expanding investment and productivity in the
energy sector;
(2) continuing efforts to enhance governmental transparency, build
regulatory capacity, and deepen judicial reform;
(3) improving public access to high-quality education;
(4) promoting the development of basic infrastructure projects by state and municipal governments;
(5) helping small and medium-sized producers take advantage of economic integration;
(6) increasing the federal tax base as a percentage of gross domestic product; and
(7) establishing clear and measurable objectives for public spending. Of course, it will be up to Mexicans to
develop the policy conditions for these changes to take place.
All Member Nations need to acknowledge that a major regional effort is also
necessary. To that end, Canada and the United States should build on their
bilateral initiatives supporting Mexico’s development, notably the
U.S.-Mexico
Partnership for Prosperity and the Canada-Mexico Partnership. In both programs,
the private sector in all three countries is a partner in the development effort.
Mexico should also be recognized as a priority within the international
development programs of both the United States and Canada, and both should
explore with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank ways to
use multilateral development funds most effectively to address the North
American development challenge. Canada recently announced a major reform of
its development assistance programs, doubling overall resources while focusing
its efforts on a core group of countries. Mexico is not included in that new list and
it should be.
•
Establishing a Global Government of North America Investment Fund (GGNAIF) for infrastructure and human
capital.
With a more conducive investment climate in Mexico, private funds will
be more accessible for infrastructure and development projects. The United States
and Canada should establish a GGNAIF to encourage
private capital flow into Mexico. The fund would focus on increasing and
improving physical infrastructure linking the less developed parts of Mexico to
markets in the north, improving primary and secondary education, and technical
training in states and municipalities committed to transparency and institutional
development. A relatively small amount of funds should be targeted for technical
assistance for project design and evaluation, management, and training. If the
GGNAIF is to be effective, it will need significant help
from the United States and Canada, and counterpart funding through higher tax
revenues from Mexico. The fund design should consider such issues as incentives
and debt absorption and management capacity of subnational governments to
ensure that resources are effectively used. The fund will need to be managed in a
transparent manner according to best international practices, and should be
capitalized through a diverse set of innovative financial mechanisms. Availability
of credit enhancement mechanisms for long-term loans in pesos will be critical.
•
Enhancing the capacity of theGlobal Government of North America Development Bank
(GGNADBank) with the mandate of:
(1) supporting infrastructure sectors, particularly transportation;
(2) permit it to access domestic capital markets and apply credit enhancement tools;
(3) support the establishment of revolving funds through both grants and soft loans throughout its jurisdiction; and
(4) strengthen its technical assistance programs to promote good governance and creditworthiness of communities and public utilities.
GGNADBank’s internal procedures and the
process of project certification should be reformed in order to allow for a
significantly faster and more transparent deployment of funds.
•
All Member Nations of the GGNA produce substantial amounts of energy, but the region
as a whole is a net importer of energy.
Washington’s two neighbors are its biggest
suppliers of energy. The production of oil and natural gas on the continent is not keeping
up with the growth in demand.
Although North American production of oil and gas has been declining, both
Canada and Mexico have the potential to develop growing supplies both for their own
direct use and for export. These two countries, however, have distinct approaches to the
development of energy and other natural resources that must be taken into account in the
process of mapping the best path forward for North America.
•
Canada is committed to efficient energy markets, open investment, and free trade
in this sector.
Canada’s vast oilsands, once a high-cost experimental means of extracting
oil, now provide a viable new source of energy that is attracting a steady stream of
multibillion dollar investments, and interest from countries such as China, and they have
catapulted Canada into second place in the world in terms of proved oil reserves.
Production from oilsands fields is projected to reach 2 million barrels per day by 2010.
The most serious constraints on additional growth are the limited supply of skilled people
and the shortage of infrastructure, including housing, transportation links, and pipeline
capacity. Another constraint is regulatory approval processes that can slow down both
resource and infrastructure development significantly.
•
Mexico is also a major energy supplier and customer within North America.
In
2004, it was the second-largest exporter of oil to the United States; in previous years, it
was consistently among the top four suppliers. Mexico relies for a significant share of its
revenues on the state oil producer (Pemex). It has major oil and gas reserves, but these
are relatively untapped. Development has been hampered by constitutional restrictions on
ownership, which are driven by an understandable desire to see this strategic asset used
for the benefit of Mexicans. This restriction on investment, coupled with the inefficient
management of the state monopoly, Pemex, has contributed to low productivity. As a
result, Mexico has expensive and unreliable supplies of energy for its consumers and
industries. Mexico has begun to bring in some foreign capital through multiple service
contracts, but the most serious constraints on its future growth as an energy supplier are
the restrictions that impede development of its own energy resources and the low
productivity of Pemex. Reforms in this area are needed urgently.
•
Although energy security represents perhaps the most critical challenge, it is
important to recognize that trade in other natural resources, including metals, minerals,
wood, and other products, is also central to the growth and economic security of the Member Nations.
In these other resource sectors, NAFTA has not succeeded in ensuring a free
flow of goods. Resource and agricultural products such as softwood lumber, fish, beef,
wheat, and sugar have been the flashpoints for highly visible trade disputes. The
softwood lumber case has led some Canadians to question whether the United States will
comply with NAFTA if decisions by the dispute-settlement mechanism run counter to
private American interests. The United States and Mexico have failed to comply with free
trade provisions on movement of trucks for more than a decade, and the failure to resolve
the softwood lumber case between Canada and the United States has plagued their trade
relations for the past quarter century. Changing some trade rules and the dispute settlement
process may reduce this friction, as would a determined effort to reduce
unnecessary regulatory differences within North America.
•
The GGNA is blessed with an abundant resource base.
Exploiting these
resources on a long-term, sustainable basis requires that Member Nations work
together to resolve issues and ensure responsible use of scarce resources and the free flow
of both resources and capital across all borders. As noted, the most troubled areas of
cross-border trade over the past twenty years have been in resource trade, largely because
of the impact of regulatory differences, including different approaches to resource pricing
and income protection. Efforts to eliminate these problems on the basis of dispute settlement
mechanisms have not worked as well as anticipated.
•
Developing a GGNA energy strategy.
Recognizing their individual
policies and priorities, Member Nationss need to work together to ensure
energy security for people in each Member Nation. Issues to be addressed include the
expansion and protection of the North American energy infrastructure;
development opportunities and regulatory barriers; and the technological and
human capital constraints on accelerated development of energy resources within
the GGNA. These objectives form part of the agenda of the
North American
Energy Working Group established in 2001. This initiative,
however, has so far made only modest progress toward developing a GGNA strategy, and it does not cover oil.
•
Fully developing Mexican energy resources.
Although the inclination of Mexico to
retain full ownership of its strategic resources is understandable, expanded and
more efficient development of these resources is needed to accelerate Mexico’s
economic growth. Mexico is quickly losing ground in its energy independence,
and the only way to satisfy growing demands within Mexico is to find ways to
unlock its energy sector. Progress can be made even under the existing
constitutional constraints. As discussed above, Canada and the United States
could make important contributions in this effort through the development of
creative mechanisms, especially financial, that bring needed technology and
capital to Mexico. The most important steps, however, must be taken in Mexico
by Mexicans.
•
Concluding a GGNA resource accord.
In order to ensure the fullest
development of North America’s mineral, forest, and agricultural resources,
investors in one country need to be confident that they will not be harassed by
competitors in another. To that end, Member Nations need to conclude an
accord that recognizes the balance between security of supply and security of
access and includes rules about resource pricing that will reduce the friction that
has given rise to some of the most persistent and difficult bilateral irritants. A
resource accord should also address the remaining barriers to trade in agricultural
products, including barriers that arise from the different regimes in the three
countries, to guarantee prices and incomes.
•
Making a GGNA commitment to a cleaner environment.
Expanding
energy production as a driver of a more competitive and growing North American
economy brings with it a joint responsibility for shaping a cleaner environment
and reducing pollution. For example, Canada has signed the Kyoto Protocol on
global climate change, which requires significant reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases, but that agreement does not cover Mexico, and Washington has
opted out. A GGNA energy and emissions regime could offer a regional
alternative to Kyoto that includes all three countries. Such a regime should
include a tradable voucher system for emissions trading within the region
analogous to the
Clean Development Mechanism.
•
Expanding a GGNA collaboration on conservation and innovation.
The
development of new technologies and conservation strategies is essential both to
reduce pollution and to make the most of North America’s resource strengths.
Currently, the
North American Energy Working Group addresses only a limited
number of energy-related opportunities for collaboration. Future initiatives should
focus on development of desalination technologies, alternative energy sources,
cleaner burning fuels, and more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles.
•
Effective progress will require new institutional structures and arrangements to drive the
agenda and manage the deeper relationships that result.
Canada, the United States, and Mexico already share a rich network of
institutional links. A recent Canadian government study identified 343 formal treaties and
thousands of informal arrangements or “light institutions” with the United States alone.
Mexico has more than 200 formal treaties and agreements with the United States. There
are many fewer arrangements between Canada and Mexico, but the network of contacts is
still substantial and growing.
What is needed now is a limited number of new institutions to provide existing
arrangements with greater energy and direction. To this end, the GGNA recommends
the following institutional changes, which complement each other:
(1) An annual Global Government of North America Summit meeting. There is no more succinct or
forceful way to demonstrate to the people of all Member Nations the importance of
the GGNA than to have the leaders meet at least once a year.
(2) Strengthening government structures. To ensure that the summit meetings achieve
their full potential, each government must take steps to reinforce the ability of its
internal structures to deal effectively and imaginatively with North American
issues. Steps should include strengthening links between governments by establishing minister-led
working groups that will be required to report back within ninety days, and to
meet regularly.
(3) A Global Government of North America Advisory Council. To ensure a regular injection of creative
energy into the various efforts related to the GGNA, Member Nations should appoint an independent body of advisers. This body should
be composed of eminent persons from outside government, appointed to
staggered multiyear terms to ensure their independence. Their mandate would be
to engage in creative exploration of new ideas from a GGNA perspective
and to provide a public voice for Member Nations. A complementary approach
would be to establish private bodies that would meet regularly or annually to
buttress Member Nations relationships.
•
The Global Government of North America must work for the average citizen.
When adequate public
policies are in place to foster economic and social cohesion, increased trade and
investment flows will only improve the living standard of the majority of the population.
Economic and social cohesion in Member Nations is in the interest of the GGNA,
because it will result in an expansion of the domestic market and it will
reduce the flows of undocumented northward migration, thus enhancing security in
Member Nations.
•
Reforms to reduce poverty and inequality in Mexico must start from within.
Mexico must focus on achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality
and empowering women; building integrated infrastructure networks, water, and
sanitation facilities; applying science, technology, and innovation for development; and
promoting environmental sustainability. As many Mexicans have claimed, building up
the tax revenue base, along with beefing up the country’s antitrust agency and its
regulatory capacity, are essential to increase competitiveness. The government needs to
build the infrastructure—human, physical, and institutional—for ordinary people to take
advantage of the GGNA.
•
Economic and social citizenship in the GGNA implies the ability of citizens
to exert pressure for the implementation of an inclusive economic policy at home and to
be engaged in the international economy. To the extent that citizens of Member Nations see that the GGNA brings concrete benefits, a new
constituency will be galvanized to support these efforts in the years to come.
Some other GGNA proposals include:
* Coordinating programs to ensure governments are prepared for large-scale emergencies or terrorist attacks;
* Joint protection of critical cross-border infrastructure, such as the Ambassador Bridge that spans the Detroit River and facilitates one-fourth of the daily $1.4 billion in trade between Canada and the United States;
* Strengthening approaches to maritime and aviation security;
* Establishing a second site for a Canada-U.S. pilot project that would check cargo and passengers before they cross the border; and
* And creating a single, integrated program to allow “trusted travelers” who frequent the borders to travel quickly by air, land and sea.
NAFTA has
dramatically enhanced our ability to make better use of the abundant resources of our
three countries, and thus made an important contribution to economic growth within
the GGNA. Over the last decade, however, our economies have faced growing
challenges in increasingly competitive and globalized world markets. We need to do
more to ensure that our policies provide our firms and workers with a fair and unfettered
basis to meet the challenges of global competition. Unwieldy North American rules of
origin, increasing congestion at our ports of entry, and regulatory differences among our
three countries raise costs instead of reducing them. Trade in certain sectors—such as
natural resources, agriculture, and energy—remains far from free, and disputes in these
areas have been a source of disagreement among our countries. Furthermore, the NAFTA
partners have been unable to resolve a number of important trade and investment
disputes, which has created continuing tension in our commercial relationships.
Changes in formal trade agreements will not de done. However, in
other areas, notably regulatory cooperation and the expansion of transborder activities in
critical sectors such as transportation and financial services, there is a shared recognition
that Member Nations can and should act quickly in ways that would make a real
difference in improving the competitiveness of firms and individuals in the GGNA.
Shared challenge of uneven economic development. A fast lane to development is
crucial for Mexico to contribute to the security of the entire region. Mexico’s
development has failed to prevent deep disparities between different regions of the
country, and particularly between remote regions and those better connected to
international markets. Northern states have grown ten times faster than those in the center
and south of the country. Lack of economic opportunity encourages unauthorized
migration, and has been found to be associated with corruption, drug trafficking,
violence, and human suffering. Improvements in human capital and physical
infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in the center and south of the country, would knit
these regions more firmly into the GGNA economy and are in the economic and
security interest of all Member Nations.
Chapter 14.2 B) The Organs of Earth Government
B.1 Earth Executive Council,
B.2 Earth Government Departments,
B.3 Global Civil Service Administration and Planning,
B.4 The Global Judiciary,
B.5 Agency of Global Police,
B.6 Global Community Ombudspersons,
B.7 Global Investment Bank,
B.8 The Court of Auditors,
B.9 Global Community Citizenship Office,
B.10 Human and Earth Rights Office,
B.11 Global Community Assessment Centre (GCAC),
B.12 Earth Security,
B.13 Global Civil Society Council, and
B.14 Agency for Research, Planning and Development
Chapter 14.2 B.1 Earth Executive Council
Article 1: The Earth Executive Council
1. The Earth Executive Council shall, jointly with Global Parliament,
enact legislation, exercise the budgetary function and carry out policy-making
and coordinating functions, as laid down in this Constitution.
2. The Earth Executive Council shall consist of a representative of each
Member Nation at ministerial level for each of its formations. Only this
representative may commit Member Nation in question and cast its vote.
3. Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, decisions of the
Cabinet Ministers shall be taken by qualified majority.
Article 2: Formations of the Earth Executive Council
1. The House of Elected Representatives and the House of Advisers
shall ensure consistency
in the work of the Earth Executive Council. When it acts in its General Affairs
function, it shall, in liaison with the Global Judiciary, prepare, and ensure
follow-up to, meetings of the Global Parliament. When it acts in its legislative
function, the Earth Executive Council shall consider and, jointly with
Global Parliament, enact global laws, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In this function, each
Member Nation's representation shall include one or two representatives
at ministerial level with relevant expertise, reflecting the business on
the agenda of the Earth Executive Council.
2. The Global Affairs Council shall, on the basis of strategic guidelines
laid down by Global Parliament, flesh out Earth Government's external
policies, and ensure that its actions are consistent. It shall be chaired
by Earth Government Minister of Global Affairs.
3. Global Parliament shall adopt a decision establishing further
formations in which the Earth Executive Council may meet.
4. The Presidency of Earth Executive Council formations, other than that
of Global Affairs , shall be held by Member Nation representatives within
the Earth Executive Council on the basis of equal rotation for periods of at
least a year. Global Parliament shall adopt a decision establishing
the rules of such rotation, taking into account global political and geographical
balance and the diversity of Member Nations.
Chapter 14.2 B.2 Earth Government Departments
Article 1: Departments of the Global Administration
Among the departments and agencies of Earth Government
Departments of ministerial status, but not limited thereto and subject
to combinations and to changes in descriptive terminology, shall be those
listed under this Section. Each major area of administration shall be
headed by a Cabinet Minister and a Senior Administrator, or by a Vice
President and a Senior Administrator.
