Member Nations of the Global Government of North America (GGNA) should be guided by the following principles:
• Member Nations should approach continental issues together with a
GGNA perspective rather than the traditional “dual-bilateral” approach that
has long characterized their relationships.
• North America is different from other regions of the world and must find its own
cooperative route forward. A new GGNA community should rely not only
on the market, but also on building a true GGNA Community.
We must maintain respect for each other’s national sovereignty by forming the GGNA protecting such sovereignty and developing the Global Constitution.
• Our economic focus should be on the creation of a common economic space that
expands economic opportunities for all people in the region, a space in which
trade, capital, and people flow freely.
• The strategy needs to be integrated in its approach, recognizing the extent to
which progress on each individual component enhances achievement of the
others. Progress on security, for example, will allow a more open border for the
movement of goods and people; progress on regulatory matters will reduce the
need for active customs administration and release resources to boost security.
GGNA solutions could ultimately serve as the basis for initiatives
involving other like-minded countries, either in our hemisphere or more broadly.
• A GGNA strategy must provide real gains for all Member Nations, and
must not be approached as a zero-sum exercise. Poverty and deprivation are
breeding grounds for political instability and undermine both national and
regional security. The progress of the poorest among us will be one measure of
success.
The threat of international terrorism originates for the most part outside North America and is due primarily on the American Government
foreign policies. All Member Nations of the GGNA should have a veto on such policies. All foreign policies should
be dealt by the GGNA and not by a single individual Member Nation. Security should be handle by the GGNA. Any weakness in
controlling access to Member Nations from abroad reduces the security of the GGNA as
a whole and exacerbates the pressure to intensify controls on intracontinental movement
and traffic, which increases the transaction costs associated with trade and travel within
Member Nations.
September 11 highlighted the need for new approaches to border management. In
December 2001, Canada and the United States signed the Smart Border Declaration and
an associated 30-point Action Plan to secure border infrastructure, facilitate the secure
movement of people and goods, and share information. A similar accord, the United
States-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement, and its 22-point Action Plan, were signed
in March 2002. Both agreements included measures to facilitate faster border crossings
for pre-approved travelers, develop and promote systems to identify dangerous people
and goods, relieve congestion at borders, and revitalize cross-border cooperation
mechanisms and information sharing. We should expand such programs to all Member Nations.
The defence of GGNA must consist of a more intense level of
cooperation among security personnel of Member Nations, both within the GGNA
and beyond the physical boundaries of the continent. The Container Security Initiative,
for example, launched by the United States in the wake of 9/11, involves the use of
intelligence, analysis, and inspection of containers not at the border but at a growing
number of overseas ports from which goods are shipped. The ultimate goal is to provide
screening of all containers destined for any port in North America, so that once unloaded
from ships, containers may cross land borders within the region without the need for
further inspections.
•
Establishing a common security perimeter by 2024. Member Nations should articulate as their long-term goal a common
security perimeter for the GGNA. In particular, Member Nations should
strive toward a situation in which a terrorist trying to penetrate our borders will
have an equally hard time doing so, no matter which country he elects to enter
first. We believe that these measures should be extended to include a commitment
to common approaches toward international negotiations on the global movement
of people, cargo, and vessels. Like free trade a decade ago, a common security
perimeter for the GGNA is an ambitious but achievable goal that will require
specific policy, statutory, and procedural changes in all three nations.
•
Developing a GGNA Border Pass. Member Nations should develop a
secure GGNA Border Pass with biometric identifiers. This document
would allow its bearers expedited passage through customs, immigration, and
airport security throughout the region. The program would be modeled on the
U.S.-Canadian “NEXUS” and the U.S.-Mexican “SENTRI” programs, which
provide “smart cards” to allow swifter passage to those who pose no risk. Only
those who voluntarily seek, receive, and pay the costs for a security clearance
would obtain a Border Pass. The pass would be accepted at all border points
within the GGNA as a complement to, but not a replacement for, national
identity documents or passports.
•
Developing a unified GGNA border action plan. The closing of the
borders following the 9/11 attacks awakened all three governments to the need for
rethinking management of the borders. Intense negotiations produced the bilateral
“Smart Borders” agreements. Although the two borders are different and may in
certain instances require policies that need to be implemented at two speeds,
cooperation by Member Nations in the following areas would lead to a better
result than a “dual-bilateral” approach:
- Harmonize visa and asylum regulations, including convergence of the list of “visa waiver” countries;
- Harmonize entry screening and tracking procedures for people, goods, and vessels (including integration of name-based and biometric watch lists);
- Harmonize exit and export tracking procedures;
- Fully share data about the exit and entry of foreign nationals; and
- Jointly inspect container traffic entering Member Nations ports, building on the Container Security Initiative.
•
Expanding the GGNA border infrastructure. While trade has nearly tripled across both
borders since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA were
implemented, border customs facilities and crossing infrastructure have not kept
pace with this increased demand. Even if 9/11 had not occurred, trade would be
choked at the border. There have been significant new investments to speed
processing along both the Canadian-U.S. and Mexican-U.S. borders, but not
enough to keep up with burgeoning demand and additional security requirements.
The three governments should examine the options for additional border facilities
and expedite their construction. In addition to allowing for continued growth in
the volume of transborder traffic, such investments must incorporate the latest
technology, and include facilities and procedures that move as much processing as
possible away from the border.
Security cooperation among Member Nations should also extend to cooperation on
counterterrorism and law enforcement, which would include the establishment of a
trinational threat intelligence center, the development of ballistics and
explosives registration, and joint training for law enforcement officials.
•
Increasing information and intelligence-sharing at the local, national, and global levels
in both law enforcement. Law enforcement
cooperation should be expanded from its current levels through the exchange of
liaison teams and better use of automated systems for tracking, storing, and
disseminating timely intelligence. This should be done immediately. However, the ultimate goal needs to be the timely
sharing of accurate information and intelligence and higher levels of cooperation.
Member Nations should consider a more
extensive information-sharing and collaborative planning involving law enforcement as a means to build mutual trust and pave the
way for closer cooperation in the future. Training and exercises should be
developed to increase the cooperation and interoperability among and between the
law enforcement agencies. These steps will provide better
capabilities for detection of threats, preventative action, crisis response, and
consequence management. At least one major exercise conducted by law
enforcement authorities should be established as a goal
over the next year. Of course, the extent of cooperation will be affected by the
progress of reform of the police forces, customs, and judicial branch in Member Nations.
In addition to the sharing of information, a Joint Analysis Center should
be established immediately to serve as a clearing house for information and
development of products for supporting law enforcement.
•
Intensifying Mexican efforts to accelerate its economic development.
NAFTA has transformed Mexico, but it has also deepened and made much more visible
the divisions that exist in the country. Indeed, the northern part of Mexico, where the
population has a higher level of education and is better connected to American and
Canadian markets, has grown significantly faster than the center and the south.
NAFTA was designed to create new opportunities for trade and investment in
Mexico and thus complement Mexican development programs. Officials hoped that
Mexico would grow much faster than its more industrialized partners and begin to narrow
the income gap among the three countries. However, investment has been modest,
preventing Mexico from achieving higher levels of growth. Indeed, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that, with significant levels
of investment, Mexico’s potential growth rate could reach 6 percent. But that requires big
changes in current policies. For example, the World Bank estimated in 2000 that $20
billion per year for a decade is needed for essential infrastructure and educational projects
in Mexico.
The gap in wages has led many Mexicans to travel north in search of higher
incomes and better opportunities. For the past three decades, Mexico has been the largest
source of legal immigrants to the United States, and Mexican-Americans make
increasingly valued and growing contributions to the life of the United States and,
through remittances, to their families at home. Mexico is also the leading source of
unauthorized migration, with attendant economic and security problems in both countries
and untold hardships for Mexican migrants. Over time, the best way to diminish these
problems is by promoting better economic opportunities in Mexico. Mexico also requires
significant reforms in its tax and energy policies so that it can use its own resources more
effectively to advance its economic development.
To achieve this objective, Mexico must reorient its economic policies to encourage more
investment and to distribute the benefits of economic growth more equitably and
efficiently across the country. Progress needs to be made, in particular, in the
following areas:
(1) dramatically expanding investment and productivity in the
energy sector;
(2) continuing efforts to enhance governmental transparency, build
regulatory capacity, and deepen judicial reform;
(3) improving public access to high-quality education;
(4) promoting the development of basic infrastructure projects by state and municipal governments;
(5) helping small and medium-sized producers take advantage of economic integration;
(6) increasing the federal tax base as a percentage of gross domestic product; and
(7) establishing clear and measurable objectives for public spending. Of course, it will be up to Mexicans to
develop the policy conditions for these changes to take place.
All Member Nations need to acknowledge that a major regional effort is also
necessary. To that end, Canada and the United States should build on their
bilateral initiatives supporting Mexico’s development, notably the U.S.-Mexico
Partnership for Prosperity and the Canada-Mexico Partnership. In both programs,
the private sector in all three countries is a partner in the development effort.
Mexico should also be recognized as a priority within the international
development programs of both the United States and Canada, and both should
explore with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank ways to
use multilateral development funds most effectively to address the North
American development challenge. Canada recently announced a major reform of
its development assistance programs, doubling overall resources while focusing
its efforts on a core group of countries. Mexico is not included in that new list and
it should be.
•
Establishing a Global Government of North America Investment Fund (GGNAIF) for infrastructure and human
capital.
With a more conducive investment climate in Mexico, private funds will
be more accessible for infrastructure and development projects. The United States
and Canada should establish a GGNAIF to encourage
private capital flow into Mexico. The fund would focus on increasing and
improving physical infrastructure linking the less developed parts of Mexico to
markets in the north, improving primary and secondary education, and technical
training in states and municipalities committed to transparency and institutional
development. A relatively small amount of funds should be targeted for technical
assistance for project design and evaluation, management, and training. If the
GGNAIF is to be effective, it will need significant help
from the United States and Canada, and counterpart funding through higher tax
revenues from Mexico. The fund design should consider such issues as incentives
and debt absorption and management capacity of subnational governments to
ensure that resources are effectively used. The fund will need to be managed in a
transparent manner according to best international practices, and should be
capitalized through a diverse set of innovative financial mechanisms. Availability
of credit enhancement mechanisms for long-term loans in pesos will be critical.
•
Enhancing the capacity of theGlobal Government of North America Development Bank
(GGNADBank) with the mandate of:
(1) supporting infrastructure sectors, particularly transportation;
(2) permit it to access domestic capital markets and apply credit enhancement tools;
(3) support the establishment of revolving funds through both grants and soft loans throughout its jurisdiction; and
(4) strengthen its technical assistance programs to promote good governance and creditworthiness of communities and public utilities.
GGNADBank’s internal procedures and the
process of project certification should be reformed in order to allow for a
significantly faster and more transparent deployment of funds.
All Member Nations produce substantial amounts of energy, but the region
as a whole is a net importer of energy. Washington’s two neighbors are its biggest
suppliers of energy. The production of oil and natural gas on the continent is not keeping
up with the growth in demand.
Although North American production of oil and gas has been declining, both
Canada and Mexico have the potential to develop growing supplies both for their own
direct use and for export. These two countries, however, have distinct approaches to the
development of energy and other natural resources that must be taken into account in the
process of mapping the best path forward for North America.
Canada is committed to efficient energy markets, open investment, and free trade
in this sector. Canada’s vast oilsands, once a high-cost experimental means of extracting
oil, now provide a viable new source of energy that is attracting a steady stream of
multibillion dollar investments, and interest from countries such as China, and they have
catapulted Canada into second place in the world in terms of proved oil reserves.
Production from oilsands fields is projected to reach 2 million barrels per day by 2010.
The most serious constraints on additional growth are the limited supply of skilled people
and the shortage of infrastructure, including housing, transportation links, and pipeline
capacity. Another constraint is regulatory approval processes that can slow down both
resource and infrastructure development significantly.
Mexico is also a major energy supplier and customer within North America. In
2004, it was the second-largest exporter of oil to the United States; in previous years, it
was consistently among the top four suppliers. Mexico relies for a significant share of its
revenues on the state oil producer (Pemex). It has major oil and gas reserves, but these
are relatively untapped. Development has been hampered by constitutional restrictions on
ownership, which are driven by an understandable desire to see this strategic asset used
for the benefit of Mexicans. This restriction on investment, coupled with the inefficient
management of the state monopoly, Pemex, has contributed to low productivity. As a
result, Mexico has expensive and unreliable supplies of energy for its consumers and
industries. Mexico has begun to bring in some foreign capital through multiple service
contracts, but the most serious constraints on its future growth as an energy supplier are
the restrictions that impede development of its own energy resources and the low
productivity of Pemex. Reforms in this area are needed urgently.
Although energy security represents perhaps the most critical challenge, it is
important to recognize that trade in other natural resources, including metals, minerals,
wood, and other products, is also central to the growth and economic security of North
America. In these other resource sectors, NAFTA has not succeeded in ensuring a free
flow of goods. Resource and agricultural products such as softwood lumber, fish, beef,
wheat, and sugar have been the flashpoints for highly visible trade disputes. The
softwood lumber case has led some Canadians to question whether the United States will
comply with NAFTA if decisions by the dispute-settlement mechanism run counter to
private American interests. The United States and Mexico have failed to comply with free
trade provisions on movement of trucks for more than a decade, and the failure to resolve
the softwood lumber case between Canada and the United States has plagued their trade
relations for the past quarter century. Changing some trade rules and the dispute settlement
process may reduce this friction, as would a determined effort to reduce
unnecessary regulatory differences within North America.
The GGNA is blessed with an abundant resource base. Exploiting these
resources on a long-term, sustainable basis requires that Member Nations work
together to resolve issues and ensure responsible use of scarce resources and the free flow
of both resources and capital across all borders. As noted, the most troubled areas of
cross-border trade over the past twenty years have been in resource trade, largely because
of the impact of regulatory differences, including different approaches to resource pricing
and income protection. Efforts to eliminate these problems on the basis of dispute settlement
mechanisms have not worked as well as anticipated.
•
Developing a GGNA energy strategy. Recognizing their individual
policies and priorities, Member Nationss need to work together to ensure
energy security for people in all Member Nations. Issues to be addressed include the
expansion and protection of the North American energy infrastructure;
development opportunities and regulatory barriers; and the technological and
human capital constraints on accelerated development of energy resources within
the GGNA. These objectives form part of the agenda of the North American
Energy Working Group established in 2001. This initiative,
however, has so far made only modest progress toward developing a GGNA strategy, and it does not cover oil.
•
Fully developing Mexican energy resources. Although the inclination of Mexico to
retain full ownership of its strategic resources is understandable, expanded and
more efficient development of these resources is needed to accelerate Mexico’s
economic growth. Mexico is quickly losing ground in its energy independence,
and the only way to satisfy growing demands within Mexico is to find ways to
unlock its energy sector. Progress can be made even under the existing
constitutional constraints. As discussed above, Canada and the United States
could make important contributions in this effort through the development of
creative mechanisms, especially financial, that bring needed technology and
capital to Mexico. The most important steps, however, must be taken in Mexico
by Mexicans.
•
Concluding a GGNA resource accord. In order to ensure the fullest
development of North America’s mineral, forest, and agricultural resources,
investors in one country need to be confident that they will not be harassed by
competitors in another. To that end, Member Nations need to conclude an
accord that recognizes the balance between security of supply and security of
access and includes rules about resource pricing that will reduce the friction that
has given rise to some of the most persistent and difficult bilateral irritants. A
resource accord should also address the remaining barriers to trade in agricultural
products, including barriers that arise from the different regimes in the three
countries, to guarantee prices and incomes.
•
Making a GGNA commitment to a cleaner environment. Expanding
energy production as a driver of a more competitive and growing North American
economy brings with it a joint responsibility for shaping a cleaner environment
and reducing pollution. For example, Canada has signed the Kyoto Protocol on
global climate change, which requires significant reductions in emissions of
greenhouse gases, but that agreement does not cover Mexico, and Washington has
opted out. A North American energy and emissions regime could offer a regional
alternative to Kyoto that includes all three countries. Such a regime should
include a tradable voucher system for emissions trading within the region
analogous to the Clean Development Mechanism.
•
Expanding a GGNA collaboration on conservation and innovation. The
development of new technologies and conservation strategies is essential both to
reduce pollution and to make the most of North America’s resource strengths.
Currently, the North American Energy Working Group addresses only a limited
number of energy-related opportunities for collaboration. Future initiatives should
focus on development of desalination technologies, alternative energy sources,
cleaner burning fuels, and more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles.
Effective progress will require new institutional structures and arrangements to drive the
agenda and manage the deeper relationships that result.
Canada, the United States, and Mexico already share a rich network of
institutional links. A recent Canadian government study identified 343 formal treaties and
thousands of informal arrangements or “light institutions” with the United States alone.
Mexico has more than 200 formal treaties and agreements with the United States. There
are many fewer arrangements between Canada and Mexico, but the network of contacts is
still substantial and growing.
What is needed now is a limited number of new institutions to provide existing
arrangements with greater energy and direction. To this end, the GGNA recommends
the following institutional changes, which complement each other:
•
An annual Global Government of North America Summit meeting. There is no more succinct or
forceful way to demonstrate to the people of all Member Nations the importance of
the GGNA than to have the leaders meet at least once a year.
•
Strengthening government structures. To ensure that the summit meetings achieve
their full potential, each government must take steps to reinforce the ability of its
internal structures to deal effectively and imaginatively with North American
issues. Steps should include strengthening links between governments by establishing minister-led
working groups that will be required to report back within ninety days, and to
meet regularly.
• A
Global Government of North America Advisory Council. To ensure a regular injection of creative
energy into the various efforts related to the GGNA, Member Nations should appoint an independent body of advisers. This body should
be composed of eminent persons from outside government, appointed to
staggered multiyear terms to ensure their independence. Their mandate would be
to engage in creative exploration of new ideas from a GGNA perspective
and to provide a public voice for Member Nations. A complementary approach
would be to establish private bodies that would meet regularly or annually to
buttress Member Nations relationships.
The Global Government of North America must work for the average citizen. When adequate public
policies are in place to foster economic and social cohesion, increased trade and
investment flows will only improve the living standard of the majority of the population.
Economic and social cohesion in Member Nations is in the interest of the GGNA,
because it will result in an expansion of the domestic market and it will
reduce the flows of undocumented northward migration, thus enhancing security in
Member Nations.
Reforms to reduce poverty and inequality in Mexico must start from within.
Mexico must focus on achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality
and empowering women; building integrated infrastructure networks, water, and
sanitation facilities; applying science, technology, and innovation for development; and
promoting environmental sustainability. As many Mexicans have claimed, building up
the tax revenue base, along with beefing up the country’s antitrust agency and its
regulatory capacity, are essential to increase competitiveness. The government needs to
build the infrastructure—human, physical, and institutional—for ordinary people to take
advantage of the GGNA.
Economic and social citizenship in the GGNA implies the ability of citizens
to exert pressure for the implementation of an inclusive economic policy at home and to
be engaged in the international economy. To the extent that citizens of Member Nations see that the GGNA brings concrete benefits, a new
constituency will be galvanized to support these efforts in the years to come.
Some other GGNA proposals include:
* Coordinating programs to ensure governments are prepared for large-scale emergencies or terrorist attacks;
* Joint protection of critical cross-border infrastructure, such as the Ambassador Bridge that spans the Detroit River and facilitates one-fourth of the daily $1.4 billion in trade between Canada and the United States;
* Strengthening approaches to maritime and aviation security;
* Establishing a second site for a Canada-U.S. pilot project that would check cargo and passengers before they cross the border;
* And creating a single, integrated program to allow “trusted travelers” who frequent the borders to travel quickly by air, land and sea.
NAFTA has
dramatically enhanced our ability to make better use of the abundant resources of our
three countries, and thus made an important contribution to economic growth within
the GGNA. Over the last decade, however, our economies have faced growing
challenges in increasingly competitive and globalized world markets. We need to do
more to ensure that our policies provide our firms and workers with a fair and unfettered
basis to meet the challenges of global competition. Unwieldy North American rules of
origin, increasing congestion at our ports of entry, and regulatory differences among our
three countries raise costs instead of reducing them. Trade in certain sectors—such as
natural resources, agriculture, and energy—remains far from free, and disputes in these
areas have been a source of disagreement among our countries. Furthermore, the NAFTA
partners have been unable to resolve a number of important trade and investment
disputes, which has created continuing tension in our commercial relationships.
Changes in formal trade agreements will not de done. However, in
other areas, notably regulatory cooperation and the expansion of transborder activities in
critical sectors such as transportation and financial services, there is a shared recognition
that Member Nations can and should act quickly in ways that would make a real
difference in improving the competitiveness of firms and individuals in the GGNA.
Shared challenge of uneven economic development. A fast lane to development is
crucial for Mexico to contribute to the security of the entire region. Mexico’s
development has failed to prevent deep disparities between different regions of the
country, and particularly between remote regions and those better connected to
international markets. Northern states have grown ten times faster than those in the center
and south of the country. Lack of economic opportunity encourages unauthorized
migration, and has been found to be associated with corruption, drug trafficking,
violence, and human suffering. Improvements in human capital and physical
infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in the center and south of the country, would knit
these regions more firmly into the GGNA economy and are in the economic and
security interest of all Member Nations.
Germain Dufour
President
Global Community Earth Government
http://globalcommunitywebnet.com/GlobalConstitution/
globalcommunity@telus.net
GlobalConstitution@telus.net
Back to top of page
CANADA TODAY is under threat. The country's capacity and even existence as an independent nation, able to shape its own political, social and economic future, are at risk.
Relations between Canada and the United States (US) are decidedly chilly these days: the Iraq war, trade disputes, name-calling, and bickering at the
border.
It doesn't mean that the relationship will grind to a halt. With more than half a million people and a billion dollars worth of trade crossing the border daily that is not going to happen.
Every day thousands of cars, trucks, trains and planes roll across the Canada-U.S. border as more than $1 billion in trade circulates
between the countries. Year in and year out, Canada and the United States are each other’s biggest trading partners. The longtime
relationship is worth hundreds of billions annually.
Canada’s exports to the U.S. accounted for $348.4 billion – about 84 per cent – of the $410.7 billion in goods shipped out of the country last year. Conversely, about 71 per cent of Canada’s $356 billion in imports last year arrived from the U.S.
Together the United States, Canada and Mexico have a trading relationship worth more than $700 billion a year; an increase of 88 percent between 1993 and 2003.
Economic retaliation is unlikely because the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has changed the trading relationship between the two
countries. Many plants in Canada now have North American product mandates and are producing for the entire Canada-U.S. market, while those in the U.S. operate in the same fashion.
That means a huge amount of cross-border trade is now intra-company trade. That creates a strong incentive for business to lobby both governments to avoid economic disruptions or retaliation no matter what the nature of the relationship at the top.
The U.S. has a vital interest in keeping
the border open. Its economy would
be hurt, whether in the integrated auto
and other manufacturing sectors, or in petroleum
and other vital resource sectors.
Thus, both countries would be highly
motivated to minimize disruptions and normalize
cross-border traffic quickly should another
terrorist attack occur.
The most important priority for Canadian diplomacy over the next few years is to reach a new accommodation with the United States
because it is only when that relationship is comprehensible, predictable and sound that the country can again assume a meaningful world
role.
There is a wide gap in attitudes between
the business élite and the Canadian
public. Business leaders are closer to U.S.
policymakers in their attitudes on a range of
issues, from the war in Iraq to missile defense
to Kyoto. Unlike the general public, they favour
minimalist government and low taxes.
They believe we must fall into line with U.S.
policies at all costs or risk our economic security.
Many would like Canada to become more
like the U.S. Although small in number, this
group has great capacity, as the record shows,
to shape the public debate and influence policmakers. Allowing corporate North America to define our interests as a nation implies, in the end, complete regulatory harmonization with
the U.S. and the subordination of our economic, social, cultural, environmental and defence policies to U.S. policies.
Business elites and many of our own politicians argue that Canada can and should enter into a relationship with the U.S. which is similar
to the relationship between the countries of the European Union (EU). However, it is a mistake to think that harmonization or integration with the U.S.
will cause the U.S. to adopt Canadian or Canada-friendly policies. While the EU countries enjoy a relatively balanced relationship,
Canada and the U.S. are far from equal partners. The economic and military superpower status of the U.S. makes such balance
impossible. Thus, although it is rarely acknowledged by our economic and political elites, the practical implications of closer ties
to the U.S. are that Canada will be forced to adopt U.S. policies through immense economic pressure. Everything from health care to
immigration to security to control of resources would be affected. How would Canada maintain any sort of distinct identity or
sovereignty in such conditions? The simple answer is that it wouldn't. Canada would become an American colony in all but name;
it would not become the 51st state, because that would mean political integration on a par with the level of economic integration,
which is not a factor in any proposals for deep integration (FTA, NAFTA, etc.).
This is an even more pressing issue at a moment in history when the U.S. is governed by an administration that is repealing civil rights
and liberties, pulling money from social programs, disputing the scientific evidence for climate change and increasing pollution, and
most disturbing of all, withdrawing from agreements and treaties which have allowed the world to develop an international rule of law.
While Canada remains committed to multilateralism, the U.S. has refused to participate in a long list of important international
conventions and treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute of the International Criminial Court, the land mines and
nuclear test ban treaties, and many others. Nor has the U.S. respected the U.N. in launching its war against Iraq, a predatory invasion of
the Iraqui people for their oil & gas resources.
Meanwhile, every public opinion poll continues to demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of Canadians don't want to be just like the
U.S. Canadians may respect the U.S. ideals of freedom and democracy, enjoy some U.S. movies, T.V., music and authors, and remain
committed to the close neighbourly relationship between the people of the two countries, but that doesn't mean that Canadians want to
adopt every aspect of U.S. policy or sacrifice our ability to make unique democratic decisions of our own. Most of us still believe
that there are important differences between the U.S. and Canada, and that these differences should be preserved.
Many Canadians disagree strongly with the policies of the current U.S. administration, and object to implementing similar policies
here at home. Unfortunately, our voices are rarely being heard when compared with the abundant propaganda of the "continentalists",
and those advocating "deep integration".
"Continentalists" and
"deep integration" proponents rarely miss an
opportunity to warn that another terrorist attack
is inevitable and that an extended border
disruption (or series of border disruptions)
would be devastating for the Canadian
economy unless we protect ourselves by entering
into agreements with the US. What is needed,
they say, is a comprehensive negotiation where
trade-offs across sectors are possible.
"Deep integration" is an economic term. It refers to economic integration that goes well beyond removal of formal barriers to trade and includes various ways of reducing the international burden of differing national regulations, such as mutual recognition and harmonization.
"Deep integration" means, in reality, subjugating many of Canada's policies to those of the United States — including trade, immigration, energy, water, our dollar, taxation, defence and the environment — but without any corresponding voice in the governance structure — that is, the U.S. government — where decisions affecting many aspects of Canadian life would be made.
For example, "deep integration" means:
a) giving the US whatever access to our energy that they want, even if that means dropping our pledge to deal with climate
change through the Kyoto agreement.
b) water exports to the United States;
c) take on major new defence expenditures (presumably by buying lots of U.S.-made military technology);
d) give up policies on culture and agriculture, including the Canadian Wheat Board; and so on.
Canadians would not only become almost powerless in addressing their fundamental future economic concerns, but would also lose the capacity to control the social environment and the ability to adjust to change because social policy would also end up being driven by U.S. policies.
What kind of
Canada do proponents envisage at the end of
the proposed deep integration path? And what
guarantees would we have that, no matter what
economic or security integration agreements
are in place, the Americans wouldn’t still close
or disrupt the border? The FTA dispute
mechanism was supposed to protect us from
U.S. actions against softwood lumber, cattle,
and other exports, but has disastrously failed
to do so.
Here, then, is the real story behind “deep integration”. Canada’s business class simply cannot compete with its U.S. counterpart. They refuse to pay for the necessary research and development, refuse to train their workers, are constantly begging for more tax cuts, and are notoriously risk-averse. As well, Canadian companies are eager to simply sell out to U.S. corporations. Since 1989, more than 95 percent of foreign investment in Canada has gone to buying up Canadian companies. Head offices are pouring over the border.
The sheer lack of entrepreneurial vision is evident in Bay Street’s determination to tie itself to what more and more economists are
declaring a declining economic power. The growing consensus is that smart countries and companies are getting in on the game where the
growth is: China, India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. But not Canadian companies.
One of the reasons: the US is now beginning to lose its technology-based competitive advantage. The countries of western Europe,
Japan, Korea, and even China have set ambitious national goals and are building universities, inviting immigration, and have clear
objectives regarding industrial development and new technologies.
The United States is the economy and country to which Canada’s business leaders want us to tie our star. But even worse, the Government
of Canada and Canada's business class
actually believes they can negotiate a good deal with the current U.S. administration and Congress. This is delusional, given the rapid
devolution of the U.S. into an imperial theocracy. It’s time for Canadians to look elsewhere for leadership; our economy, not to mention
our country, is far too important to leave to the failed imagination of Bay Street CEOs.
Under their interpretation of co-operation, Canada, the U.S. and
Mexico would insulate themselves against competition from the rest of the world with a common external tariff, and with an outer
security perimeter against external threats. But as fast as they would construct these walls on the outside, they would tear down almost every fence on the inside with an across-the-board harmonization of rules, regulations and laws on everything from who could seek asylum in North America to military operations to pollution and environmental controls.
In fact, they would go so far as to give Canadians and Americans absolute freedom to decide where they would work and where they would live.
The Europeans have built an economic and social partnership to address shared problems by creating shared political and administrative institutions. But it would be naïve to believe that similar institutions could be effectively created and made to work genuinely in a Canada-U.S. or a Canada-U.S.-Mexico partnership.
The United States, as an imperial superpower, acts on the basis of economic and military power, not shared decision-making, and, given the country's great size, would not consider serious sharing of decisions and power with a much smaller country. The United States is instinctively unilateral in its approach.
If Canada is to pursue "deep integration" with the United States, then logically we should seek political union as well so that Canadians in the different provinces would have some opportunity to influence decisions. But this logical implementation of "deep integration" would also mean the end of Canada as a distinct geopolitical entity and the conversion of our provinces into U.S. states.
Despite accelerated economic integration
over the last 15 years, opinion polling reveals
a deep and growing divide in attitudes and
values between Canadians and Americans. It
shows that the vast majority of Canadians do
not want to be more like Americans. On the
contrary. Nevertheless, a majority of Canadians
have come to terms in principle with
NAFTA, and a substantial minority favour
even closer economic integration. However,
most Canadians don’t understand the term
economic integration, and support drops
sharply the more NAFTA and deep integration
initiatives are perceived to impair domestic
policy freedom. For the vast majority of
Canadians, continued support is contingent
on maintaining policy independence and retaining
Canada’s unique social character. The
confusion around the issue of integration and
independence is understandable. The linkages
are often subtle and indirect, and it takes time
for effects to become apparent. And the mainstream
media gatekeepers and pundits have
steered away from this issue.
"Continentalists" promote a "strategic bargain," in which Canada and the United States, over time, would move to a customs union with a
common made-in-Washington trade policy toward the rest of the world and the free movement not only of goods and services but also of
people and capital. (So much for maintaining Canadian ownership of banks, TV networks or transportation systems.) This would also affect
foreign policy: If the United States decided to use trade measures to punish China, attack the Europeans or demonize the Cubans,
we would have to follow suit.
Deep integration advocates see a customs
union as the next stage in the deepening of
the continental market. Key features associated
with a customs union are the creation of
a common external tariff applied to all nations
not part of the free trade area, and the establishment
of a common trade policy. However,
many advocates of a customs union also insert
elements of a common market into their definition.
A common or single market is seen in
the literature as a still deeper stage of economic
integration. It would include removing barriers
to trade and investment in agricultural,
cultural, legal, communications, and financial
services. It would include the harmonization
of a vast range of regulations and policies (economic,
social, environmental, cultural, immigration,
etc.) to achieve the free movement of
goods, services, capital and labour.
This is an important point. The lesson to
recall from the FTA is that what was initially
presented as a proposal for a conventionally defined
free trade agreement resulted in a comprehensive
deep economic integration agreement
that went far beyond the border into
the very heart of domestic policy-making
power. An alleged customs union negotiation
would be similarly open-ended, making it hard
in advance to fully evaluate its costs. We also
know from the FTA experience that much will
be surrendered for little gain.
The standard economic case for a customs
union is that removing rules of origin (which
currently prevent back-door entry of imports
from a non-member country into the NAFTA
area through a member that has lower tariffs
on the those imports) will eliminate costly
administrative procedures and thereby reduce
transaction costs of doing business. Proponents
have built economic models that greatly
exaggerate the overall efficiency gains to the
economy (2-3% of GDP). Many of us remember
the wildly exaggerated estimates of
economic benefits of tariff elimination generated
by similar models during the FTA debate.
Nor do they mention possible costs of
removing rules of origin as an incentive to
source production within Canada.
But the focus on rules of origin is a diversion
The far greater cost is that a common
trade policy—given the huge difference in
power—would mean effectively handing over
Canada’s trade policy to U.S. authorities. It
would have huge implications for both our
domestic institutions and our relations with
the rest of the world.
Contrary to proponents’ claims that Canada’s
positions and protections in multilateral
trade agreements, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), are very similar
to those of the U.S., there are in fact major
differences between them, affecting crucial
public policy areas. They include public services
such as health, education, and other social
services which, unlike in the U.S., are not
organized on market principles; they include
cultural industries, which are subsidized and
regulated in direct opposition to free trade
principles. Also on the table would be agricultural
marketing boards, the Canadian
Wheat Board, telecommunications, and banking.
The U.S. has long objected to these policies
and would definitely target them for elimination.
In heavily protected U.S. sectors such as
sugar, textiles, beef and tropical fruits, Canada
would ironically be pushed to raise its tariffs
to U.S. levels. It would mean complying with
U.S. trade embargoes on Iran and Cuba and
ending Canadian trade preferences with, for
example, Commonwealth countries. And it
would foreclose future independent policy
initiatives. Imagine, for example, under a common
trade policy persuading American drug
companies and policy-makers to allow the
export of cheap generic AIDS drugs to poor
countries.
If, like the FTA, a negotiation were to go
beyond the traditional scope of a customs union,
the potential for ceding regulatory and
policy space would grow exponentially. A
major Canadian objective would obviously be
exemption from U.S. trade protection laws.
But the U.S. Congress would insist that this
be off-limits and would (as it does now) say
that, if Canada wants exclusion from U.S.
trade laws, it has merely to adopt U.S.-style
laws and practices.
Since the signing of the Free Trade Agreement, Canada's economic life has become deeply integrated into a newly developed North American economy dominated and directed by U.S. corporate and government interests. The results of this integration are now clear. As critics predicted, the free flow of capital without government regulation has resulted in job losses - 276,000 high-paying industrial jobs have been lost - and we are now even more dependent on the American economy as a destination of our exports, and therefore less able to direct our own economy.
Economic growth in the 10-plus years of free trade has been the worst since the 1930s. Following the deregulation imperative of free trade, we have both abandoned the tools of industrial development that brought us the auto industry and deliberately pursued policies that weaken the domestic economy in the interests of trade. By pursuing trade with a low Canadian dollar we have exposed Canadian industry to the most extensive and prolonged sell-off of Canadian assets in our history.
The results of this for ordinary working Canadians have been the longest period of stagnation in standard of living levels in the country's history, a dramatic erosion of social programs and protection for workers, extreme levels of economic insecurity for millions of workers and their families, and a loss of democratic control by citizens over the future of their communities. All of these economic facts can be traced primarily to the FTA and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The nature of those binding and legal agreements prevents from reconsidering our options.
After a decade of rapid integration with the United States and the harmonization of public policy with that country, Canada is experiencing the fastest and most dramatic increases in social and economic inequality in its history. The severe erosion of programs such as UI/EI, social assistance and income redistribution, and the erosion of our progressive tax system, have systematically changed the relationship between individual citizens and their community - because government is a reflection of community. As citizens perceive government as less and less relevant to them, we feel less and less commitment to the collective that is neighbourhood, community and country.
Economic integration with the United States is changing our very definition and conception of culture and therefore our sense of who we are. In the United States, culture is seen as a commodity no different from any other commodity - it is equated with entertainment in the marketplace. Canada's efforts to promote our unique identity and reflect it to ourselves confront increased burdens as the United States watches over any "unfair subsidies" to our so-called "cultural industries." As we become integrated with the most powerful example of consumer society in the world, we face the threat of commodification of our cultural traditions and their gradual assimilation into the American entertainment industry.
When Canada signed the FTA and NAFTA it agreed to do what literally no other country in the world has ever agreed to. It agreed to give up, forever (barring the abrogation of the trade agreements themselves), the legislative and regulatory authority to protect and conserve the country's energy resources for its own needs. In effect, we have completely abandoned that part of our national sovereignty that allowed us to determine our energy policy based on the current and future needs of Canadian consumers - both individual and industrial. It is perhaps the most stunning and dramatic example of the abandonment of the national interest by any government in the history of Canada.
But it is not just oil and gas that have been affected by our free trade relationship with the United States. The free trade imperative is now threatening to force deregulation of electricity as well. Our water is threatened by provisions in NAFTA that define water as a "good" and therefore tradable, opening up the possibility that U.S. water shortages will be met by the diversion of Canadian rivers.
Canada's environment is increasingly threatened by the nearly total integration of the North American economy. Canada's ability to meet the requirements of environmental treaties has already been seriously compromised by a NAFTA case that successfully challenged our attempt to halt the cross-border movement of toxic waste. Since the signing of the free trade agreement the federal government has attempted to pass just two new pieces of environmental legislation. Both failed the free trade test and were, in effect, overturned by the provisions of NAFTA. It is impossible to know how many other pieces of legislation were considered by the government but rejected. The chill effect - declining to pass legislation for fear it will attract a costly NAFTA or WTO challenge - has crippled Canada's ability to pass laws and regulations to protect its own environment.
For decades Canada occupied a unique and often very difficult terrain in the international field. A small country by population standards and dwarfed by the American colossus on its border, Canada nonetheless wielded the influence of a middle power much larger than its size would have suggested.
We were once seen by developing countries and other smaller powers as a voice of internationalism and multilateralism. We often championed human rights and took a leading role in the boycott of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Canada's foreign aid was generous and the Canadian International Development Agency had a reputation for taking a genuine interest in development issues. It was not just an agency promoting Canadian industry and foreign trade.
Since the 1960s Canada developed and maintained a reputation for being a nation committed to peacekeeping,
indeed defined the modern notion of that international role.
The past 13 years of the new free trade relationship with the United States, in which Canada's commitment to free-market policies of economic globalization has increased, have witnessed a fundamental shift in Canada's foreign policy and its peacekeeping tradition. Right now, Canada has soldiers fighting in an undeclared war and the Canadian command has absolutely no say in directing them. They are not peacekeepers; they are not even Canadian soldiers. They are, in effect, American conscripts.
If Canada was to go along the United States on the
integration of Canadian forces under the new
U.S. Northern Command, or on ballistic missile
defense, Canada would squander the respect
Canada gained within the international
community for its stand on the Iraq war, reinforcing
the image of Canada as a mere proxy
for the superpower.
Canada's generous foreign aid policy has been replaced by a diminished contribution to developing nations and an extremely aggressive
trade policy that mimics that of the United States and is in complete support of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the
World Bank. CIDA is now a shameless promoter of Canadian industry - including the nuclear industry - and has tarnished its reputation
as a development agency. Canada, partly through deliberate policy shifts and partly because it feels it cannot risk offending what is
now its almost exclusive trading partner, has become little more than an echo of American foreign policy interests.
In the context of the new imperatives of the economic globalization, both sovereignty and democracy have suffered. Economic
globalization has demanded of nations that they give up those aspects of sovereignty that allow for democracy. A nation's ability to
regulate and guide economic development and the actions of capital are key to a nation's well-being in a free market system.
The signing of the FTA and NAFTA have fundamentally altered Canada's sovereignty and its democracy. In order for Canada to create a "level playing field" with the United States it has systematically gutted its social programs, its progressive tax system, its commitment to industrial development, and its laws and regulations balancing the power of employees and employers.
In order to accomplish this free trade objective, the Canadian and provincial governments and other political institutions have gone to great lengths to lower Canadians' expectations of democratic governance. Using scare tactics regarding the large deficits of the early 1990s, the deliberate misrepresentation of government employees, huge cuts to health and education budgets, and a relentless campaign to promote tax cuts, governments at all levels have convinced many Canadians that their values can no longer be reflected in government policy.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that as a result of this campaign, and the cuts to government services, democracy in Canada is in crisis. Unprecedented levels of cynicism and anger toward government and political parties have led to the lowest voter turn-outs in the country's history.
The denigration of Canadian political institutions and democracy has been accompanied by a growing and alarming disregard for civil
liberties and human rights in this country. Nowhere is the link between globalization and trade and the downsizing of democracy more
obvious. The rapid Americanization of Canada's institutions and political culture demands both long-term and immediate action. Only by giving Canadians a genuine opportunity to engage in a dialogue about their country and its future direction can this alarming erosion of democratic participation and the resulting decline of the nation be halted and eventually reversed.
The aftermath of September 11 taught us
a great deal about how deeper economic integration
has heightened our vulnerability. It
reminded us that the Bush administration will
not hesitate to unilaterally rewrite the terms
and conditions of entry into its market, regardless
of NAFTA; it will not hesitate to link
our compliance with its security demands to
access to the United States market. It reminded us that we
have a border and that it matters. It reminded
us that we are different and that our different
laws and institutions are under siege. People
are beginning to connect
integration and loss of independence: NAFTA meant
deeper economic integration and increased
vulnerability which, with September 11, meant
the Smart Border Accord, which in turn
meant pressure for still deeper integration.
To want to chart a different course does
not imply a better course. This is not about
moral superiority, or being anti-American. It
is simply that we have different values and interests.
We want to be able to reaffirm and
preserve our founding myths, our historical
experiences, and the values that have shaped
and defined us. We want our laws and institutions
to reflect our unique social character
and our successful blend of individual and collective
rights. We want to chart a course that
affirms our highly original political experiment:
our complex (tri-national and
multicultural) federation with its long and
extraordinary history of resolving tensions and
conflicts peacefully. We also want, as we have
in the past, to make our mark in the world: to
help strengthen the fabric of international law,
to advance world peace, social justice, democracy,
and the environmental sustainability of
the planet.
Back to top of page
In 1994, along with Mexico, Canada and the United States enact the North American Free Trade Agreement, aimed at eliminating
tariffs on trade between the signing countries. Over the past decade, several other agreements were signed between these three countries. One of them was concernend with refugees.
Formally signed by Canada and the U.S. in December 2002, the Safe Third Country Agreement stipulates that refugees must seek asylum in
whichever of the two countries they reach first. The new rules would eliminate
the practice of asylum shopping by refugee applicants by allowing their return to the last safe country from which they came.
The agreement prevents asylum-seekers from using Canada as a “foot-in-the-door” to the U.S. or vice versa. Border official have
subsequently said the new legislation will force more refugees to cross the border illegally.
Bill C-11 was brought into force two weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. It provides for a more thorough refugee screening process than previously used. Before the bill was passed, applicants would be photographed, fingerprinted and checked for a criminal record. If they seemed law-abiding and legitimate as applicants, they would be allowed into the country to settle while they awaited a formal hearing. A full criminal check wouldn’t be held until they were accepted at the hearing. Under C-11, the security check is done at the border. Under the new rules the applicant is interviewed up to five hours to determine if he or she is a genuine refugee. That’s followed by a security check by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). If there is any suspicion, the RCMP and FBI can be called upon for assistance. The entire process is to be done within 72 hours. If it is determined they are not a genuine refugee, or they fail the security check, they are deported. Otherwise they are allowed into Canada to await a formal hearing. Although Bill C-11 was in the works prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, it was implemented two months before being passed.
Canada, the United States, and Mexico have agreed on a framework to implement the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.
Both opponents and proponents of the agreement say that this is the most important step in the integration of North America since NAFTA was signed more than a decade ago.
As liberal democracies, the three governments of North America also share common principles:
protecting individual rights, upholding the rule of law, and ensuring equality of
opportunity for their citizens. North America, in short, is more than an expression of
geography. It is a partnership of sovereign states with overlapping economic and security
interests, where major developments in one country can and do have a powerful impact
on the other two.
North America is also energy interdependent. In
2005, Canada and Mexico were the two largest exporters of oil to the United States.
Canada supplies the United States with roughly 90 percent of its imported natural gas and
all of its imported electricity.
In March 2005, the leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States adopted a
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), establishing ministerial level
working groups to address key security and economic issues facing North America
and setting a short deadline for reporting progress back to their governments.
To that end, the Task Force proposes the creation by 2010 of a North American
community to enhance security, prosperity, and opportunity. The Task Force proposed a community
based on the principle
that “our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary.” Its
boundaries will be defined by a common external tariff and an outer security perimeter
within which the movement of people, products, and capital will be legal, orderly, and
safe. Its goal will be to guarantee a free, secure, just, and prosperous North America.
On the economic side, for instance, the initiative is aimed at both increasing productivity within the three nations and also at making their markets more competitive with the European Union and China. Joint undertakings could include standardizing some regulations on businesses, making it easier for business people to move across borders, increasing cooperation on energy exploration and moving toward a common external tariff for certain North American products sold to other economic blocs.
A U.S.-Canada-Mexico task force has made some bold recommendations, including a North American border pass based on fingerprints or eye scans to speed border crossings. The Task Force on the Future of North America also advocated an "outer security perimeter" around the three countries, to be achieved by harmonizing visa and asylum regulations, integrating "watch" lists, conducting joint law enforcement training, setting up a "marine defense command" to protect North American ports and pursuing closer military cooperation with Mexico.
In 1993, the United States, Mexico, and Canada adopted a labor side accord to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), pledging to work toward broad improvements in the situation of labor rights in their respective countries. Seven years after the agreement entered into force, however, the record shows that the three countries have failed to live up to this commitment. While the accord, known formally as the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), has suffered from structural defects from the outset, it nevertheless holds far greater potential to promote workers' rights and high labor standards than its limited use by the signatory states would suggest. Instead of exploiting this potential, the NAFTA countries have ensured the accord's ineffectiveness in protecting workers' rights.
The NAALC, for all its deficiencies in practice, remains the most ambitious link between labor rights and trade ever implemented. It broke new ground by creating labor-related obligations and establishing sanctions for failure to fulfill them in certain cases. Under the accord, the signatories must ensure that labor laws and regulations provide for "high labor standards;" they must strive to improve those standards; and they must ensure access to "fair, equitable, and transparent" mechanisms for enforcing their labor law. The accord obligates the parties to effectively enforce their own labor law in eleven key subject areas, and stipulates that a "pattern of practice" of non-compliance (more than one incident) in certain subject areas could lead to the appointment of an outside panel of experts to recommend measures to resolve the problem. A "persistent pattern" of non-enforcement (a sustained or recurring pattern of practice) could lead to the convocation of an arbitral panel and the imposition of sanctions.
As initially conceived and negotiated, NAFTA included no provisions to protect labor rights in its text or through a side agreement.
The NAALC that was finally negotiated by Canada, Mexico, and the United States sidestepped thorny international political issues by avoiding any suggestion that it was intended to harmonize labor standards in the three countries, and by ruling out the establishment of multinational judicial processes or appeals procedures. Rather, it aims to promote broad improvements in the labor rights situation in the signatory countries, and it relies on political engagement between the parties as the means to address its violations. Nongovernmental organizations and individuals also play a part by signaling to the governments involved when the obligations established by the accord have not been met.
The NAALC does not incorporate international labor rights norms; instead, it calls on the signatories to enforce their domestic labor standards effectively while working cooperatively with the International Labor Organization (ILO). Interestingly, the labor principles subject to NAALC consideration include a wider range of issues than the ILO's core standards, including protections for migrant workers and workers' compensation.
The NAALC does not purport to resolve labor rights problems in specific cases. A worker unjustly fired for organizing a union in the United States, for example, could not expect a case filed under the NAALC to lead to job reinstatement. Fixing problems with the enforcement of laws designed to protect freedom of association, however, would fall squarely within the accord's obligations. Similarly, a Mexican worker victimized by an unfair labor tribunal could not expect a NAALC-based process to correct the legal deficiencies suffered in the case heard domestically, but could legitimately expect the pact to contribute to a general improvement in Mexico's labor tribunals.
Even with these limitations, the NAALC has the potential to be a much more effective mechanism for promoting labor rights than it has been, in practice, to date. For example, if they had the necessary political will, the signatories could use the NAALC's framework to identify longstanding weaknesses in labor rights protections and develop comprehensive plans to remedy them. They could contribute to the development of labor law policy in their respective countries by promoting higher standards. And they could contribute to the wider international debate about how to link labor rights and trade.
An important structural weakness of the NAALC is its lack of an independent oversight body. Thus, for example, if the United States violates one of its NAALC obligations, Mexico or Canada can either
separately or jointly push for a remedy. In practice, however, in deciding whether to do
so they are likely to also take account of other issues relevant to their bilateral relations with the United States, such as
immigration, narcotics control, and the promotion of trade. So it is scarcely surprising that the NAALC's potential as a means for
promoting respect for, and improvements in, labor rights has been dramatically underused.
The NAALC signatories have taken advantage of the accord's silence on how to deal with allegations of non-compliance with its obligations. National Administrative Offices (NAOs), which were created in each signatory country to address instances of non-compliance, have complete discretion to determine which complaints to accept and how to investigate and report on them. Similarly, the accord sets out no standards regarding how labor ministries in the three signatory states should design programs to address instances of non-compliance with NAALC obligations. As a result, the governments have sometimes ignored issues raised by petitioners, reported on issues but then failed to include them in government-to-government talks, or included them in bilateral discussions but established no mechanism for remedying the problems identified.
The accord permits the establishment of an outside panel of experts known as an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) and an arbitral panel to address non-compliance with the obligation to enforce certain NAALC labor principles. However, it is vague on what to do when the accord's other obligations are not met. The obligation to have high labor standards, to strive to improve those standards, and to provide access to fair labor tribunals cannot by themselves be brought before such bodies. This constitutes a serious problem, because these obligations are fundamental to the ability of any government to enforce its labor law. In addition, the failure of a signatory government to enforce laws related to three fundamental labor rights-freedom of association and the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike-cannot be brought before an expert committee or sanctions panel at all.
Back to top of page