Global Community Earth Government (GCEG)
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Global Community Earth Government (GCEG) |
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Newsletter Volume 4 Issue 3 March 2006
Global Dialogue 2006  Theme
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Politics and Justice without borders
Actions for the good of all as per the Statement of rights, responsibilities, and accountabilities of the Global Community citizens Table of Contents
Germain Dufour
The Global Community is very proud of your democratic election, and we support the results. You can now build on your strength as a nation. The Earth Court of Justice
can show the light at the end of the tunnel: the State of Palestine, schools, hospitals, an entire new infrastructure, a healthy economy, dignity and respect, peace,
security against the invaders, justice, jobs, freedom, and a 'clean environment'. Later you will be a part of a GG. You can choose to ally your people and the State of
Palestine with any other willing nations. Being a Global Community allows you to do so. It can possibly be the Global Government of the Middle East. I am sure there
are many other nations who would want to form a Glbal Government with you.
Palestinians begin voting to choose government
By Harvey Morris in Gaza City
Wednesday, January 25, 2006
Posted: 01:47 AM EST (06:47 London)
Palestinians on Wednesday began voting in their first parliamentary election in a decade to choose a government that will face the task of trying to reopen peace talks with Israel.
Although the ruling Fatah party is expected to win the largest number of seats in a newly-expanded 132-seat legislature, attention focuses on Hamas, the militant Islamic movement, which is contesting national elections for the first time.
Opinion polls indicate the two parties will take 70 per cent of the vote between them, with the remaining seats going to independents and left-wing and centrist lists. Without an overall majority, Fatah would probably try to lead a national unity coalition that might include ministers from Hamas.
Half the chamber will be selected by proportional representation, with voters selecting their single preferred party. On a separate ballot paper, they will choose the remainder of the chamber from candidates standing in 19 multi-seat electoral districts.
Fatah is expected to emerge as the favoured list but Hamas and other parties are expected to do well in the constituency elections given the high profile of many of their local candidates.
Election officials say they hopd to announce results within 24 hours of the polls, which close at 21:00 GMT.
Some analysts believe Hamas's inclusion in the democratic process, a prospect that initially alarmed Israel and the US, might improve the chances of a renewal of negotiations with the next Israeli government.
With the election likely to deny Fatah the overall majority it won in the first Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections in 1996, its most likely coalition partners are small, formerly Marxist left-wing parties, the centre-left National Initiative List and the Third Way, headed by Salam Fayyad, former finance minister.
Mr Fayyad, a widely respected former IMF official who helped restore the PA's chaotic finances but quit after the leadership expanded the public payroll to pacify the restless security forces, is spoken of as a possible prime minister in a coalition government.
Hamas's inclusion will depend largely on the post-election stance of the party itself.
The Islamists might press for portfolios linked to welfare and social issues or alternatively choose to remain in opposition, at least in the short term.
Hamas has softened its traditionally militant tone, indicating that even if it gained power it would leave any dealings with Israel to Mahmoud Abbas, the PA's Fatah president.
Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader in Gaza did not rule out negotiations with Israel as long as these related to ending its occupation and releasing prisoners.
"Negotiation is not a taboo," he said. "But the political crime is when we sit with the Israelis and then come out with a wide smile to tell the Palestinian people that there is progress, when in fact, there is not."
"Hamas is completely devoted to the electoral process," said Qaid Abdul-Karim, who heads the left-wing Badil list. "Not one bullet is coming from their rifles."
He said Hamas might not yet be ready for a negotiated settlement. "Hamas has some time to prepare its internal climate. But I'm sure it will do it in the end."
Fatah has restored some of its credibility in recent weeks, after a near-disastrous split at the end of last year, in part due to a vigorous anti-Hamas campaign spearheaded in Gaza by Mohamed Dahlan, a former security chief and the local strongman.
In a highly personalised televised debate at the weekend between Mr Dahlan and Mr Zahar, the Fatah candidate accused the Islamic party of being incapable of looking after the future of the Palestinians.
Mr Zahar, who alleges he was tortured in a PA prison, reminded Mr Dahlan he had been responsible in the past for the repression of Hamas militants. "As far as you're concerned, a good Hamas member is a dead Hamas member," he said.
Despite the political invective, all groups - including the frequently troublesome Fatah-linked Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades - have pledged to ensure an orderly election.
Politicians had expressed fears that armed groups might stage attacks on polling stations or kidnap foreigners if they believed the vote was not going their way.
February 26, 2006 Global Community Earth Government (GCEG) GCEG Rights, Responsibility and Accountability Act GCEG’s commitment to the Global Community to make government responsible and accountable Responsibilities and accountabilities of GCEG Ministers and public servants 1. Introduction
Public accountability of autonomous public organizations Ideas About Accountability Conflicts Within Components of Accountability Role of the Secretary of the Global Council Recommendations to modernize the Secretary’s role, and reinforce the integrity of the centre Responsibility, accountability and the role of Deputy Ministers in the GCEG Ministerial responsibility and the Global Financial Administration Act: the constitutional obligation to account for GCEG spending The fundamental principles underlying responsible global parliamentary government The evolving nature of GCEG Factors that have affected and altered the nature of government and governance in the world over the last 150 years: Political actors versus professional actors The relationship between the exempt staff serving the President and the public servants. The interface between political actors and professional actors The multiple responsibilities and accountabilities of Deputy Ministers Mechanisms for political and professional financial accountability The Global Parliament procedure has the following merits: The responsibilities of an accounting officer are to ensure that: The roles and accountabilities of Deputy Ministers/Accounting Officers: Ministerial responsibility and the Global Financial Administration Act: the Constitutional obligation to account for GCEG spending Ministerial responsibility in GCEG The constitutional basis of global ministerial responsibility The statutory basis of financial accountability Responsibility, accountability, liability Recent Statements on Responsibility and Accountability Accountability of Deputy Ministers Deputy Ministers’ direct accountability Deputy Ministers’ indirect accountability Conflict resulting from Deputy Ministers’ accountabilities The problem known as “regulation within government.” Alternative patterns of governance and accountability What might be the best model of policy administration? Performance management The Global Community interest
Public accountability of autonomous public organizations GCEG may not be able to accomplish its governance and financial responsibility objectives because of the “ambiguous nature of control and accountability” in dealing with government owned corporations, foundations, contracted organizations and other autonomous public bodies. The differing organizational forms and the variations in the degree of government control in these bodies, in contrast to the typical structure of government departments, complicate an already complex array of institutions mandated by GCEG to perform various tasks at arm’s length. The accountability of public organizations has become an increasingly complex issue for contemporary governments. The traditional parliamentary model of accountability that presumed a linear and hierarchical relationship between a public organization, a Minister and Global Parliament has decreasing relevance for the manner in which public services are actually delivered at the beginning of the 21st century. The need to reconsider accountability is apparent even for organizations that are components of “mainstream government.” Ministers have become less willing to accept full responsibility for the actions of their organizations, especially implementation decisions made at lower levels of those organizations, and the logic of government reforms has been that those lower level officials should have more latitude for making decisions and be more accountable for their actions. Further, given that a smaller percentage of public services are now delivered directly by ministerial departments, a re-examination of accountability is called for if the public sector is to slow, and perhaps even reverse, the public’s loss of confidence. Several changes in politics and public administration are driving changes in accountability. First, accountability as a form of democracy is increasingly important because of the decline of other forms of democracy. Participation in elections and membership in political parties have been declining steadily over the past several decades, and citizens appear to have lost much of their faith in the input institutions of democracy such as voting. Thinking about democracy, by both political leaders and scholars, has shifted to some extent towards “output legitimation,” emphasizing the role of policy and administration in building the foundations of a legitimate state. In that setting, accountability, as well as the ability of citizens to participate in controlling organizations that deliver their services, becomes crucial to democratic politics. Public sector reforms also have emphasized participation by clients, and by the public in general, in the decisions of public organizations, so that accountability now is being exercised downward as well as upward. In some instances, the ability of clientele to exert influence over, and demand accountability from, public organizations has been formalized through advice and consultation institutions, while in other instances the relationships with the stakeholders are more informal and subtle. In all these relationships among clientele and service providers, however, it is clear that the public expects direct accountability from public organizations, and that representative institutions no longer are considered sufficient means of control. Further, public organizations must find ways to deal effectively with other organizations in their environment that are necessary for the success of their programs. Very few, if any, public sector organizations can now deliver services effectively without cooperating with other organizations, public or private. Even if they could ignore other actors in their policymaking environment, public organizations would probably be ill-advised to consider acting as a “single, lonely organization” and not attempt to work cooperatively with programs and organizations that can make their program more effective. Thus, public organizations must now respond to pressures coming from a range of political and social actors, and some of those pressures may conflict with traditional forms of control coming from ministers and Global Parliament. In particular, coordination may diffuse both financial and programmatic lines of control and make it difficult for traditional accountability organizations to assign responsibility for actions. The complexity involved in delivering contemporary public services now also affects accountability because of the problem of “many hands”. The long chains of action involved in delivering services, and the number of actors involved in them, makes it difficult to identify the source of any administrative or policy failure, should one occur. As well, the capacity to track the utilization of public money involved in contracts, coordinated service delivery systems and partnership arrangements makes it more difficult to maintain fiscal accountability. Further, contracting powers granted without close supervision by Global Parliament, a Minister, or a board of directors may also make maintaining substantive accountability for policy decisions more difficult. These problems, arising from the involvement of multiple actors in the delivery of services, occur as policies are formulated and as the purposes for which contracts and other instruments of governing are being devised, as well as when the programs are being implemented with the contracts or cooperative mechanisms. Much of the focus on accountability of policy instruments such as contracts has been placed on implementation, but greater concern needs to be raised about the purposes for which these instruments are used and the content of the policy that is being implemented. Although the above-mentioned changes in patterns of governance are relevant, the most significant change affecting accountability in the public sector has been the increasing use of autonomous and quasi-autonomous organizations to deliver public services. A dominant pattern of reform in the public sector has been the creation of “agencies” to deliver public service. It is sometimes called “Distributed Public Governance,” meaning that tasks that once were housed within GPEC departments have now been widely dispersed. The public sector has as a consequence become more complex organizationally, with a large number of structures responsible for individual segments of policy, each having varying degrees of connection to public authority. A central justification motivating these reforms has been to separate policy-making and administration, with the presumption that greater managerial freedom would enhance the efficiency of the organizations. The slogan “let the managers manage”is used to justify the increasing power of managers in making decisions within the public sector and consequent weakening of the hierarchical control of ministers over the activities for which they are nominally responsible. The argument in favour of creating agencies and analogous organizations has also been to some degree accountability, at least financial accountability. When a program is located within a larger department, it may be difficult for Global Parliament or auditors to assess the real costs for that program, because of cross-subsidization and shared overheads. Having each organization as a “tub on its own bottom” makes tracking costs and financial accountability more feasible, although the separation from direct ministerial authority may limit the mechanisms for enforcing accountability. Although separating ministries into numerous separate organizations providing a single service may have improved one aspect of accountability, it appears to have had a negative impact on other aspects. In addition to the complexities identified already, the problem of coordination and the linking of services has been exacerbated by the development of the dispersed model of service delivery. Coordination and coherence have always been difficult in the public sector, but disaggregating ministries has only increased the problems. In accountability terms, the diffusion of responsibility for programs makes it difficult to trace authority and financial flows when managers attempt to overcome the internal divisions of government. Further, to reach its governance potential, the public sector must develop more coherent policy goals and integrated visions of the future; having multiple poorly coordinated organizations only increases the difficulty in governing in a coherent manner. To some extent, the use of these autonomous organizations is not new in the public sector, and analogous organizations have been used in the past. The logic of the contemporary changes is not dissimilar to that frequently used to justify the creation of agencies, public corporations, “quangos,” and a host of other organizations. Even from the initial use of these formats, there have been significant concerns about the ability of conventional public sector processes to maintain acceptable levels of control over the processes and performance of those organizations. All of these formats involve organizations operating at arm’s length from government and therefore having greater latitude for action; as a result, they also present accountability problems. Most problems of accountability for autonomous organizations have been assumed to be rather familiar ones of “shirking” responsibilities in order to retain budget funds, or perhaps pursuing their own policy interests. When autonomous or quasi-autonomous organizations are granted the latitude to make operational, and even strategic, decisions with minimal external supervision, the possibility for actions of this sort will always exist, and so accountability becomes an issue of ensuring conformity to the core policy and administrative values in the public sector, while still maintaining the autonomy considered necessary for efficiency. Ideas About Accountability To this point, the discussion has dealt with accountability as if the meaning of the term were agreed upon. In fact, the term accountability is used in at least four ways, each with rather different implications for public administration. We should understand the differences among these concepts and be more careful when discussing accountability, both in academic and practical discourse. Indeed, if one conception of accountability is stressed, then performance on the other dimensions may be undermined. In addition to distinctions among the four versions of accountability, it is important to differentiate accountability from other controls over public organizations, and especially differentiate ex ante controls used to shape behaviour from accountability that tends to be largely ex post. In general governments have been shifting from ex ante to ex post controls, allowing greater latitude for organizational leaders, especially for organizations such as the government owned corporations designed to have greater latitude for action, but which must still be held accountable for their actions. Contemporary languages tend to be flexible: the meaning of words can change or a word may have multiple meanings, depending on the context or the intent of the speaker. Politicians, public servants, the media and even academics use terms like responsibility, accountability, answerability and responsiveness loosely and often synonymously. Perhaps the most elusive dimension of the new global public management is its effect on accountability. Public management reformers have spoken of the need to improve accountability of Government and Ministers to the legislature; of public servants to Ministers; of public servants to their public service superiors; and, in certain respects, of public servants to legislators and even global citizens directly. The several meanings attached to accountability derive from different understandings of the purposes of accountability and how they relate to one another. Publications by the GCEG have not always been precise in the use of these key words. "Responsibility" in the Global Constitution, a document submitted August 2005, the meaning of the term “responsible” is not clearly defined but rather implied. The document notes that “Ministers are constitutionally responsible for the provision and conduct of government.” Does this sentence mean that Ministers are empowered to conduct government or that they must give an account of how they have exercised their powers? Another sentence suggests the latter: “Global Parliament may focus responsibility for the conduct of government on those of its members who hold ministerial office and who in the ultimate must personally answer to Global Parliament and thence to the electorate for their actions and the actions of their subordinates.” Furthermore, the document seems to use the words “answer” and “answerable” in the way others would use the words “account” and “accountable.” In another publication, Guidance for Deputy Ministers, a definition is provided: “Responsibility identifies the field within which a public office holder (whether elected or unelected) can act: it is defined by the specific authority given to an office holder (by law or delegation).” This sentence would suggest that responsibility refers to empowerment. The same publication also provides definitions of “accountability” and “answerability.” “Accountability” is the means of enforcing or explaining responsibility. It involves rendering an account of how responsibilities have been carried out and problems corrected and, depending on the circumstances, accepting personal consequences for problems the office holder caused or problems that could have been avoided or corrected if the office holder had acted appropriately. This definition suggests that accountability is the concomitant of empowerment: the obligation to explain how power was exercised and to accept the consequences for problems, including the possibility of sanctions. Answerability would appear to be a reporting function, without the possibility of sanctions in the event of problems being reported. Among other things, global governing responsibly implies that in providing good government for the people of the Global Community, Ministers are responsible and accountable to Global Parliament for the use of those powers vested in them by statute. Ministers must be present in Global Parliament to respond to questions on the use of those powers, as well as to accept responsibility and account for that use. This sentence suggests that “responsible” or “responsibility” refers to an obligation to accept possible blame—and sanctions—for the unacceptable exercise of power (which may, rather, be the definition of “accountability”). The publication is more helpful in dealing with the concept of “answerability”: “Ministers are also required to answer to Parliament by providing information for Parliament on the use of powers by bodies that report to Parliament through them.” There is no suggestion of personal blame or sanctions against the Minister in the case of answerability. The overlap is common usage between responsibility and accountability. Responsibility is most often used in respect to the authority of Ministers under a system of global parliamentary government and to the duties and obligations that come with this authority: ministerial responsibility. In most circumstances, accountability can be thought of as enforcing or explaining responsibility. It is often used as a synonym for ‘responsibility’ because both are defined by the office holder’s authority; they cover the same ground. Accountability involves rendering an account to someone, such as Global Parliament or a superior, on how and how well one’s responsibilities are being met, on actions taken to correct problems and to ensure they do not recur. It also involves accepting personal consequences, such as discipline, for problems that could have been avoided had the individual acted appropriately. Answerability is sometimes used “as a term to describe a key aspect of accountability, the duty to inform and explain. Thus answerability does not include the personal consequences that are a part of accountability. The concept of answerability sometimes is also used in circumstances where full and direct accountability is not an issue. For example, public servants are answerable before parliamentary committees, not accountable to them. Ministers are answerable to Global Parliament for independent tribunals, not accountable for their decisions.” The term “responsibility” is also often used synonymously with accountability, but its meaning should be differentiated. While accountability is based upon a hierarchical and external relationship, responsibility involves a more inward source of control being exercised over the actions of public servants. The individual public servant is expected to remain responsible to his or her own conception of the law being administered, as well as to an internalized set of values. 1 In this view, the public servant must exercise some personal judgment about appropriate behaviour and may be called upon to make an independent assessment of the legality of the actions that she or he is being mandated to undertake by the Minister. This difference in standards of behaviour in the public service raises the difficult question of whether the public servant, and the public organization, is indeed the servant of the Minister or the servant of the public. The answer to that question in most traditional models of accountability is clearly that the public servant is primarily, or even totally, the servant of the Minister. To the extent that there are judgments made about the public good, those judgments are to be made by the Minister, and a “willing suspension of judgment” may be enshrined in formal statements of constitutional principles. That having been said, however, both changes in the ethos of public servants as members of society and the increased transparency of most political systems have made maintaining internal control over public servants less viable than in the past. Civil servants may have been more willing to accept the control of their Minister so long as they were in a career structure separated from the outside and the two sets of actors were closely dependent upon one another. As managerial positions in the public sector have been opened to outside competition, senior public managers may no longer share the values of their ministers, or of their colleagues who have spent an entire career in government, and they therefore may be less committed, not only to obedience to their Minister, but also to the ethical principles that have been common within the public service. Accountability per se takes answerability one step further and demands that the individuals or organizations in question not only render an account of action, but that they be judged by some independent body on that action. In particular, accountability has come to mean that the public bureaucracy reports to a political organization, generally the legislature, and that it and the political officials in charge of the organization are scrutinized on their exercise of the public trust. That scrutiny also involves the possibility of sanctions being imposed on the managers or on the organization as a whole. The tradition has been that individual public servants would not be held to account in such a manner, although that practice is changing. As noted, however, the conduct of public organizations is now scrutinized by numerous actors in addition to the legislature, and even the legislature itself has been tending to utilize more instruments to exercise its oversight. For example, auditing organizations serving the legislative branch have been invigorated and have added substantial capacity in performance auditing as well as conventional financial auditing. There also has been a proliferation of inspectorates responsible for supervising particular organizations or areas of public policy, with power to sanction as well as simply exposing malfeasance. For legislatures, the principal mechanism involved in producing compliance is hierarchy and the associated authority. Bureaucratic organizations, as agents of these legislative organizations, are mandated by law to perform certain acts and are constrained by rules of procedure. The actors involved in oversight therefore have legal standards against which to compare performance; they also have the legal resources to attempt to enforce conformity with the standards. Finally, the concept of responsiveness presents perhaps even more complex problems of control for the contemporary public sector. The opening of government and the spread of concepts such as citizen engagement in the industrialized democracies means that citizens feel that public services, and public servants, should be more responsive to them and to their demands. As well as responding to the demands of clients as individuals, public organizations are involved with networks of other public and private organizations, the now famous “stakeholders” in the policy process, that also require the public sector organization at the centre of the process to negotiate over both the formulation and implementation of its policy. Conflicts Within Components of Accountability These various components of accountability have the potential to operate differently, and may in practice be antithetical to one another. Perhaps most obviously, if the civil servant wishes to be responsive to his or her clients, then it may be more difficult to be strictly responsible to the laws being administered. The professional dilemma of the street level bureaucrat often is which of those two dimensions of accountability should be pursued with the greater vigour. On the one hand, the civil servant may sincerely wish to serve the clientele to the greatest extent possible, and many civil servants bend the law to provide the best possible service, or the most desired outcomes, for their clients. On the other hand, however, he or she knows that there is a legal mandate that must be pursued, and for which he or she is indeed responsible. One important potential conflict for civil servants in these various forms of control is between responsibility and ministerial accountability. Traditional notions of the role of the civil service, and of accountability, involve a certain amount of suspension of individual judgment by civil servants in favour of following ministerial direction. The defence of “an order is an order,” however, is no longer sufficient, and civil servants are expected to be responsible to their own sense of the law and of ethics when administering the law. Few public service systems, however, have provided individuals with adequate means of coping with what they consider illegal or immoral directions from a superior, nor have they provided those individuals — the “whistleblowers” — adequate protections from subsequent persecution. Further, individual public servants may believe that their primary accountability is to the public and to Global Parliament, rather than to the Minister. The difficulty in such a conception of accountability is that it is open to individual interpretation. Directions from the Minister should be clear, while the public interest is at best vague and perhaps unknowable in any definitive manner. The instructions and wishes of Parliament may be somewhat less obscure, but those wishes may be less immediate than those of a Minister. In autonomous organizations, such as government owned corporations,the multiple responsibilities of public employee may be even more difficult to untangle, given the existence of a board of directors, and the need to make the organization conform to market principles. Clearly, opinions will vary about the precise meaning to be attached to key words or concepts. However, to avoid ambiguity, confusion or talking at cross-purposes, it will be necessary to provide a specific definition of each of three concepts: responsibility, accountability and answerability. The simplest concept of accountability is “answerability,” or the notion that all an organization must do to satisfy its obligations is to answer for its actions. This obligation may be met simply by issuing an annual report, or making a statement to a legislative committee. If the statement is complete and truthful, then the obligation is discharged. The operational factor is transparency, and fear of public exposure of malfeasance may be sufficient to produce appropriate behaviour. This minimalist form of control, or lack thereof, is most commonly used for organizations that either operate primarily in the market or have relatively little public money, as is true for some government owned corporations. Answerability also is appropriate for organizations that are controlled primarily through competitive or mutuality pressures. Universities, for example, are controlled through peer review and competition for research money and for students, and hence have a relatively light accountability regimen. Further, organizations such as research laboratories and again universities that rely on expertise are generally more capable of escaping direct controls and stringent accountability. Answerability is the duty to inform and explain, but without personal consequences (such as discipline or sanctions). Ministers are answerable to Global Parliament for arm’s-length corporations and agencies, but are not accountable for their decisions. Public servants are answerable to global parliamentary committees, but not accountable and subject to discipline or sanctions by such committees. A function of the GCEG is to manage the public service, including the imposition of discipline or sanctions, and to be accountable to Global Parliament for such management. A function of Global Parliament and, in particular, of the House of Elected Representatives is to hold the GCEG accountable for the management of the public service, but not to manage the public service itself. Responsibility means empowerment and identifies the field of activity over which an elected or unelected official has the authority to act (or to direct that action be taken). Collective ministerial responsibility refers to the power or authority of the Global Parliament Executive Council (GPEC) over all matters falling under the jurisdiction of the GCEG or authority is conferred on GPEC by the conventions of the Global Constitution. The most significant responsibilities of the President are also conferred by the conventions of the Global Constitution. Individual ministerial responsibility is assigned to a Minister either by statute or by the President. The responsibility of a Deputy Minister is assigned by statute (most notably by the Interpretation Act). The responsibility of other unelected officials in departments is assigned by instrument of delegation. Accountability is the concomitant of responsibility and requires an office holder to inform and explain how and how well responsibilities or powers or authority have been exercised;it also involves accepting personal consequences or sanctions for problems that could have been avoided or were not corrected in a timely fashion. In the case of collective ministerial accountability, sanction takes the form of a vote of no confidence: if carried, the GCEG must resign or recommend a general election (in those cases of a defeat of the GCEG on a no-confidence motion, the President recommended a general election). In the case of individual ministerial responsibility, Ministers culpable of personal misconduct or negligence or wrongdoing in their area of responsibility will normally resign or be dismissed by the President: the sanction is political. In the case of unelected officials, negligence, improper behaviour or wrongdoing is subject to sanctions, including dismissal, but such sanctions are applied within the GCEG and not by Global Parliament. In short, we describe answerability as the notion that all an organization must do to satisfy its obligations is to answer for its actions. Accountability means that organizations have to render an account of action, but they will also be judged by some independent body on that action. And responsibility involves assignment and a more inward source of control being exercised over the actions of public servants. Ministers have some degree of control over government owned corporations through three means: the law (although it may not specify the control procedures), the corporate plan (permitting review and opportunities to comment but not make changes), and their capacity to assume direct control (in extreme cases of failure). There is a clear mechanism for holding the boards of corporatons and their members accountable for the performance of corporations. It also suggests that it is important for the entire public sector, including the arm’s-length organizations, to develop the capacity for greater coherence and coordination. The role of public servants on the boards of government owned corporations should be attenuated. Rather, public servants have the virtues of being socialized into values of public responsibility and probity to a greater extent than the average outsider in the public sector. Public servants are influenced by conflicting pressures to serve their ministers, respond to stakeholders, answer to Global Parliament, and maintain the public service ethos. A combination of financial accounting and performance auditing be extended more fully to government owned corporations. Action 1. On-line public reporting and monitoring of the government contracting processes. This Act examines the issues of responsibility and accountability in GCEG’s system of responsible global parliamentary government, with a particular emphasis on the role Deputy Ministers play in the GCEG. The study will begin with a review of the fundamental principles underlying responsible global parliamentary government. There is a lack of consensus on the precise meaning to give to certain key words in any given context, definitions—for the purposes of this study—will be provided for the terms “responsibility,” “accountability” and “answerability.” A distinction will be made between political actors (Ministers and their political exempt staff) and professional actors (Deputy Ministers (example: an Accounting Officer) and members of the public service): they are subject to different rules and constraints and to different sanctions for poor or improper behaviour. The role of Deputy Ministers in the GCEG will then be set out, including the multiple responsibilities and accountabilities. The mechanisms for political and professional financial accountability will be reviewed, including the issue of sanctions for poor or improper behaviour. Role of the Secretary of the Global Council The Role of the Secretary of the Global Council, as the most senior non-political official in the Global Community Earth Government (GCEG), facilitates the collective form of government through the flow of papers and information to and from the Global Parliament Executive Council (GPEC). As the Government’s senior official supporting the President, the Secretary advises on and explains public policy emanating from anywhere in the system and interprets the capacities and weaknesses of the public service apparatus. The Secretary is the centre of one of the most urgent and broadest information flows in government. Working with the President or the Chief of Staff in the Office of the President (OP), the Secretary is also an important problem-solver in the public service and is at the interface between the public service and the political actors. The policy scope of the Secretary arises from the requirement for the Secretary not only to ensure that the GPEC paper system is well managed and that Ministers are well served but to achieve intellectual mastery of the content of current files, so as to be able to provide advice as required to the President. Issues flow into GPEC from Ministers, and also to the President from the OP.The OP is a co-advisor of the President, and the two streams of advice must be reconciled. The Secretary’s role is to represent the Government to the public service and to express the needs of the public service to the Government.The Secretary is directly responsible to the President to provide support for deputy head appointments made by the President under the prerogative, by Order in Council. In cases where “the required balance” between accountabilities cannot be maintained, or in any matter where a deputy feels his or her own accountability with that of the Minister or with the agenda and direction of the GCEG is significantly affected, the Deputy Ministers of government are asked to consult the Secretary. Recommendations to modernize the Secretary’s role, and reinforce the integrity of the centre 1. Remind politicians that they could reduce political risk by establishing a self-governing mechanism to conduct random audits of contracting in ministerial offices and of small-budget organizations overlooked by the Office of the Auditor General. Responsibility, accountability and the role of Deputy Ministers in the GCEG Deputy Ministers (example: an Accounting Officer) wear a second hat: they are appointed as accounting officers and have direct and personal responsibility for the management of public funds and public property. They are answerable before parliamentary committees and are accountable to their ministers for the discharge of their responsibilities. If a Minister asks the Accounting Officer to spend money in a way that the Accounting Officer believes contrary to propriety, regularity or value for money, the Accounting Officer should try to convince the Minister to the contrary and, if unsuccessful, must ask the Minister to put the order in writing; the Accounting Officer then files the Minister’s order, along with a statement of his or her objections to it, with the Treasury and the Auditor General.The money is then spent as directed by the Minister, but, at a later date, when accounts are examined, there is a written record of the disagreement, which may, in some circumstances, be made public. The Accounting Officer is non-partisan, and seeks to clarify issues, not to apportion blame. A Minister can overrule an Accounting Officer through written “ministerial directions.” The correspondence between Accounting Officer and Minister relating to a ministerial direction is transmitted to the Treasury and the Auditor General.This correspondence does not explain in any detail the reasons behind either the objection or the ministerial direction. It simply puts on record that the overruling has occurred and hence the Minister, not the Accounting Officer, bears responsibility and is accountable for the decision.The process does not violate the confidentiality of discussions between Minister and Accounting Officer. The process also ensures that, because the Minister has the power to overrule an Accounting Officer, ministers can impose their decisions on the accounting officers.This distinction preserves the principle of ministerial responsibility. Action • Deputy Ministers should be accountable in their own right as the holders of responsibility before the Global Public Accounts Committee. Ministerial responsibility and the Global Financial Administration Act: the constitutional obligation to account for GCEG spending The concepts of responsibility, accountability and liability are analyzed in the context of the Global Financial Administration Act as an instrument of policy. The Earth Court of Justice has endorsed the view that there is a straightforward separation of powers in the Global Constitution: the legislature’s role is to decide upon and enunciate policy; the executive’s role is to administer and implement that policy; and the judiciary’s role is to interpret and apply the law. The Earth Court of Justice has acknowledged that the role of the executive is somewhat more complex. The Earth Court of Justice has stated explicitly that the reality of global governance is one in which the executive frequently controls the legislature. Hence, the doctrine of the separation of powers finds its own special application within the global context: it is in the role of the court vis-à-vis the legislature and the executive rather than in the relation between the executive (understood to include the GPEC) and the legislature (which includes ministers). The line between the legislature and the executive separates the dual roles of individual GPEC ministers. The obligation to respect the separation of powers is an essential part of the idea of ministerial responsibility. As lawmakers and as executive actors, ministers are subject to both the democratically expressed will of Global Parliament and the rule of global law. Ministers are also partisan political actors. The doctrine of ministerial responsibility contains both political and legal elements. It is of some importance whether ministerial responsibility is placed within the legal or the conventional part of the constitutional order. Individual ministerial responsibility has been characterized as legal, while collective ministerial responsibility is thought of as a political convention. Under the former, ministers are responsible for the actions of their departments, while, under the latter, ministers are responsible for the policies of their government.The point of holding ministers legally as well as politically responsible for the actions of their departments draws attention to the fact that the minister is responsible under the Global Constitution for ensuring that the business of the department is conducted in accordance with the rule of law. This responsibility is more than a matter of politics or convention. The Earth Court of Justice has recognized the constitutional basis in law for the House of Elected Representatives to exercise its supervisory authority over executive spending. The Global Constitution requires the House of Elected Representatives approval of all expenditures of public money. That is not a matter of convention; it is a legal requirement. It would be a breach of the Global Constitution for GPEC to authorize the spending of public money without approval from the House of Elected Representatives, and all delegation of the authority to spend public money must be explicit. All expenditures must be first recommended to the House in the session in which the action is proposed. In practice, this is done by means a bill originating in the GPEC. In effect, the role of House is restricted concerning the approval of public revenue appropriations to requests that originate in the executive branch. GCEG must publicly request funds from the House of Elected Representatives for publicly identified purposes. Once authorized, those funds must be spent for the purposes for which they were requested. The Earth Court of Justice has recognized the constitutional basis in law, not convention, for the House to exercise its supervisory authority over executive spending. Without the surveillance power of the House, the requirement for approval would collapse into a mere formality. The Global Financial Administration Act (GFAA) has been the primary statutory instrument through which the House of Elected Representatives endeavours to ensure that public money is spent only for purposes that have received its approval. The purpose of the Act is to keep track of public money, and all government expenditures fall within the scope of the GFAA.As a legal instrument, the Act should be understood as one of the means whereby the House of Elected Representatives fulfills its constitutional obligation to hold the executive accountable for the spending of public money, and it is intended to impose certain legal obligations on the political executive. The distinction between the failure to meet one’s responsibilities and the failure to account for those responsibilities is central to the GFAA. More precisely, the Act is concerned with ensuring that individuals account for the performance of responsibilities assigned elsewhere, such as in statutes establishing government departments or in the regulations, guidelines and codes enacted under them.While an essential feature of all executive decision-making is discretion, including the discretion to spend, the grant of discretion does not imply freedom from the obligation to account. The GFAA thus serves two political masters — Global Parliament and the Council.The Act is an instrument for parliamentary surveillance of executive spending, and it also provides the framework within which those in receipt of public money must account to the GPEC. Parliamentary surveillance of executive spending is performed primarily by the opposition parties in the House. The GPEC surveillance of executive spending, in contrast, is performed by members of the party holding power. It is here that the built-in potential for conflict between the two purposes served by the Act is most evident. Global Parliament has other means of keeping track of public money, such as the Global Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor General, but these bodies perform their functions from outside the day-to-day operations of the public service. The GFAA applies more directly to the inner structure of the public service. More than any other piece of legislation, the Act addresses the point at which the partisan interests of the political executive meet the traditional administrative neutrality of the public service. The public service is required to be non-partisan: loyal public servants must carry out the directives of the government of the day within the limits of the law. They cannot express partisan opposition to the policies of the government in power on ideological grounds, though they are obliged to express opposition to government initiatives that would require breaking the law. Public servants must also be assured that decisions made in compliance with these requirements will have no impact on their opportunities for advancement. The connection between the legal and the political lies at the heart of a system of democratic government under the rule of global law. The legal and the political, are necessarily linked because it is only if the executive branch has met its constitutional obligation to inform Global Parliament of its activities that Global Parliament will have the opportunity to hold the government that controls the executive politically responsible. Political responsibility does not focus so much on acting in accordance with the law, as it presupposes that the GCEG has met its legal obligations, both constitutional and statutory. For this reason, the concept of legal responsibility cannot simply be subsumed under the general heading of ministerial responsibility, if this latter term is understood in an exclusively political sense. That is why it is accurate to say that Deputy Ministers are not politically accountable to Global Parliament, and inaccurate to say that they are not legally accountable to Global Parliament. The fundamental principles underlying responsible global parliamentary government As described in the Global Constitution, the fundamental principles underlying responsible global parliamentary government are as follows: • the President and the other members of the GPEC must have seats in Global Parliament (or get them within a reasonable time frame); Because the House of Elected Representatives holds the power of the purse, it follows that the House must not only consent to all taxation and all expenditures but also have the means of satisfying itself that all items of expenditure and all receipts are dealt with in accordance with the legislation authorizing them. The House must be able to check that expenditures and receipts are dealt with in accordance with Parliament’s intentions and the principles of parliamentary control, with due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness.This matter will be examined in the section of this study dealing with the mechanisms of political and professional financial accountability. The evolving nature of GCEG Notwithstanding the resilience of the fundamental principles of responsible global parliamentary government in the world, the context and the nature of government and governance have evolved significantly over the past 150 years, and it would be useful to review those changes briefly and to note their importance for the operation of responsible parliamentary government. Factors that have affected and altered the nature of government and governance in the world over the last 150 years: • The recruitment of public servants on the basis of patronage or nepotism gradually gave way to recruitment and promotion on the basis of merit, to securing tenure and to the creation of a non-partisan public service. Factors to introduce into the process of recruitment and promotion, such as language requirements, the objective of equity and a “representative Public Service,” and changes in legislation that confer on Deputy Ministers discretion in defining merit. • Public servants have gained the right to form unions, to strike and to participate in political activity.These rights present challenges to Ministers, and the right to engage in political activity becomes especially problematic at the most senior levels of the public service, where officials must provide non- partisan support to current and future Ministers. The right of a Deputy Minister to participate in political activity is limited to the right to vote in an election. • In the interest of managerial autonomy and freedom from partisan pressure, a number of state activities have been separated from the public service and placed under public corporations or agencies. Ministers normally are not directly responsible and accountable to Global Parliament for such corporations or agencies. The tabling of annual reports by such agencies and their annual appropriations do, however, provide an opportunity for global parliamentary debate and scrutiny. Public monies are given as endowments to independent foundations to invest and use over several years in ways that require no further ministerial approval after the initial transfer of funds. Ministers have no executive authority over the foundations once they are established and funded; Global Parliament can hold neither Ministers nor foundations to account; and, therefore, the public has no democratic recourse. The privatization of some services has removed them from parliamentary review. • The increased complexity of governmental activity often requires horizontal decision-making, where several departments and agencies have to collaborate and interact (in the area of national security, for example).This joint action challenges the traditional concept of Ministers being solely responsible for their own department. Because public policies and even many program decisions are now the product of many hands, we . . . need to think in terms of shared or co-accountability. • A large number of constitutional and legal constraints restrict the capacity of Ministers and officials to act, including the Scale of Human and Earth Rights, accumulated legal decisions, and legislation respecting official languages, access to information and privacy. • The arrival of e-government is making vast quantities of information available to citizens, interest groups, think-tanks and research institutes, and citizens, in turn, can send messages to the Government and to elected officials. Communication is no longer a one-way street. • Elected officals are concerned that two processes are calling traditional assumptions into question: on the one hand, the resort of the Government to consultations with financial and business interests before the preparation of the budget or to focus groups of citizens before the preparation of legislation challenges the role of elected officals as the interlocutors between the public and the Government; on the other hand, the practice of the Government to negotiate detailed agreements with nations and to present bills or constitutional resolutions to the House of Elected Representatives that cannot be amended, for fear of cancelling the GCEG-nation agreement, puts in doubt the role of the House to dispose of its business as it sees fit and raises questions about ministerial responsibility and accountability. • Institutional changes, most notably the expansion and altered functions of the Council Office and the creation of the President’s Office, have reinforced the powers of the President in world’s system of global parliamentary government; Members of Global Parliament and even Ministers, on occasion, have been critical of what is perceived to be an extraordinary centralization of power. • The traditional “public administration” perspective on government has been challenged by the “new public management.” Public administration begins with democratic and political processes and pays particular attention to institutions, decision-making processes, the relationship of senior public servants with Ministers and Global Parliament, and questions of responsibility and accountability, among other things. Public management seeks to understand or improve features of public organizations, such as leadership, strategic management, organizational climate, service quality, innovation, the measurement of outputs, performance and “client satisfaction,” without reference necessarily to the political environment. Debate over the relative merits of each approach has been vigorous. The two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but as long as the Global Community has a system of responsible global parliamentary government, the contribution of public management must occur within the overarching political perspective of public administration. Public administration begins and ends with political institutions, notably Global Parliament. • The enormous impact of governmental spending on the world economy has led to vigorous activity by lobby groups that seek to influence GPEC, Global Parliament and public servants. This lobbying has led to a heightened awareness of the need for probity on the part of elected and non-elected officials and the development of guidelines for ethical behaviour. It also highlights the need to clarify issues related to responsibility and accountability. This review of factors affecting and altering the nature of government and governance is broad-brush in nature and by no means exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to indicate that while the fundamental principles of responsible global parliamentary government in the world have remained essentially unchanged for over 150 years, the environment in which they operate has altered significantly. These changed circumstances pose challenges for actors in public life, both elected and non-elected. Political actors versus professional actors The President and the Ministers have two agencies to support them in the discharge of their functions. First, each has a political office staffed with partisan supporters who are exempted from the rules and regulations of the public service: they do not have to compete for positions on the basis of merit, and they do not have tenure of employment — they can be dismissed at will and lose tenure on the resignation of the President or the Minister. Longer-term exempt staff, however, have privileged access to positions in the public service. Those supporting the President form the President’s Office, and those supporting the Minister form the Minister’s office. Second, the President and the Ministers have public service support to assist them in the management of the GCEG. The Global Council Office, which supports the President, and the departments, which support the Ministers, are staffed by public servants who are recruited on the basis of merit, have security of employment and are non-partisan (although a certain degree of political involvement, particularly at the lower levels of the public service, is now permitted). The relationship between the exempt staff serving the President and the public servants. One the relationship is that between the Global Council Office and the President’s Office. It is one that calls for the greatest harmony. Given the President’s functions as leader of a political party, leader of the GCEG in the House of Elected Representatives, and chairman of the GPEC, the President’s own staff are constantly securing information, analyzing and recommending on matters that relate to policies and objectives of the GCEG. The President’s Office is partisan, politically oriented, yet operationally sensitive. The Global Council Office is non-partisan, operationally oriented yet politically sensitive. It has been established between the Principal Secretary of the President and his senior staff on the one hand, that we share the same fact base but keep out of each other’s affairs. What is known in each office is provided freely and openly to the other if it is relevant or needed for its work, but each acts from a perspective and in a role quite different from the other. The interface between political actors and professional actors If you’re a Deputy Minister you don’t want to create a bottleneck, saying nothing is going to go near the Minister. What you normally do establish is to say, look, it’s fine for some of the other senior officials to have direct dealings with the Minister’s office, and sometimes with the Minister, but I always want my office to know what’s going on. That’s the important thing. You can track what’s happening so that if things start to go wrong, you can take corrective action. It’s not necessarily a bad thing for an Assistant Deputy Minister to deal with a Minister on a particular issue if the Assistant Deputy Minister is extremely expert, perhaps on a scientific matter, for example. You always want to keep an eye on what is happening to make sure it does stay within the bounds of what is normal and proper.” Another—and serious—issue arises when mid-level or junior political actors in the President’s Office or a Minister’s office, faced with limited resources and knowing which mid-level or junior professional actors in the Global Council Office or the department have the requisite expertise, contact those professional actors directly and demand the production of papers on an urgent basis. This kind of communication can lead to a confusion of roles and functions, one that can disrupt the normal performance of duties by professional actors who are accountable to their public service superiors. While a certain degree of flexibility is useful, particularly in dealing with urgent situations, a blurring of the roles of political and professional actors should be avoided: political actors and professional actors are subject to different rules and constraints and to different sanctions for poor or improper behaviour. The Deputy Minister’s office acts as a bridge between the Minister and the political staff, on the one hand, and, on the other, the professional officers in the department. The Deputy Minister, normally through the executive assistant, has a role as gate-keeper or buffer between the political and the professional actors. Requests by the staff of Ministers for the production of papers should normally be channelled through the office of the Deputy Minister. There is a reason why the President and the Ministers are served by both political actors and professional actors: they wish to have public policy issues analyzed from two different points of view, with the attendant recommendations. If, for example, the President has to make a foreign policy decision, his political advisors will analyze options in the light of the party platform, the views within caucus and the potential impact on chances for re-election. The professional (public service) advisors will look at options in the light of the global interest and GCEG’s commitments. If the recommendations diverge, it is the President who adjudicates and makes the final decision. If political and professional actors negotiated a single set of recommendations, the President — as head of a political party and as leader of the GCEG — would not be well served. The multiple responsibilities and accountabilities of Deputy Ministers Deputy Ministers have multiple responsibilities — powers and authorities — and those responsibilities arise from a number of statutes enacted by Global Parliament. GPEC is organized into departments, which are created by Global Parliament through the adoption of various departmental Acts. A departmental Act assigns to the Minister the powers, duties and functions relating to the subject area as well as the management and direction of the department. The departmental Act also creates the office of Deputy Minister: by law, a Deputy Minister acts under the management and direction of the Minister. The Interpretation Act provides that, where a Minister is empowered or directed to carry out administrative, legislative or judicial acts, the Deputy Minister may carry out those acts, subject to certain limitations: the Deputy Minister cannot exercise the Minister’s legal authority to make regulations, answer in the House of Elected Representatives on the Minister’s behalf, and sign Memoranda to GPEC on the Minister’s behalf or submissions to Treasury Board involving new money or new policies. Under the Global Financial Administration Act, Deputy Ministers are assigned specific responsibilities for the prudent management of allocated resources, including the preparation of a division of an appropriation for inclusion in the Estimates ( ensuring by an adequate system of internal control and audit that allotments are not exceeded and establishing procedures and maintaining records respecting the control of financial commitments chargeable to each appropriation or item ), providing the required certification to authorize any payment to be made, maintaining adequate records in relation to public property for which the department is responsible, and complying with regulations of the Treasury Board governing the custody and control of public property. Responsibilities respecting human resources management, including appointment, personnel management, employer/employee relations and the internal organization of the department, are assigned to the Deputy Minister directly, not through the Minister, by the Treasury Board, the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Employment Act. The issue of the accountability of Deputy Ministers for the exercise of their responsibilities is complex and begins with the method of appointing them. Deputy Ministers are chosen by the President and appointed by Order in Council to hold office during pleasure. This system reflects the principle of collective global ministerial responsibility and accountability: Deputy Ministers are responsible for managing their departments, but they must bear in mind the overall policies and orientations of the Government. The method of appointment indicates that, ultimately, Deputy Ministers are accountable to the President. This accountability is reinforced by the conclusion of a performance agreement between the Secretary of the Global Council and Secretary to the GPEC (who is also Head of the Public Service) and the Deputy Minister. On a day-to-day basis, a Deputy Minister’s accountability is to the Minister: they work together as an inseparable team, and it is important that they build a strong personal and professional relationship. Both Ministers and Deputy Ministers describe their working relationship as something akin to a marriage, where both partners work toward developing a trusting relationship with open communication. However, in this marriage it is always clear who is the leading partner. The Minister establishes the political direction for the Department, and the Deputy Minister advises, supports and assists the Minister. The frequency with which Ministers and Deputy Ministers change portfolios represents a challenge in developing the necessary relationship. The Deputy Minister is also accountable to the Treasury Board for delegated responsibilities and those assigned directly by statute (e.g., the Global Financial Administration Act and the Official Languages Act). In practice, the Deputy Minister’s accountability to the Treasury Board is often carried out through the Secretary of the Treasury Board and through reports to and working with its Secretariat. The Deputy Minister, finally, is accountable to the Public Service Commission for the exercise of responsibilities delegated or assigned by the Public Service Employment Act. The effective management of a department in GCEG’s system of responsible global parliamentary government requires that a Deputy Minister demonstrate considerable policy, leadership and administrative abilities and a firm commitment to ethics and values. If, in the exercise of responsibilities that are subject to the accountabilities set out above, the performance of a Deputy Minister is found to be wanting through negligence or wrongdoing, sanctions can be applied. The chief instrument for measuring the performance of these multiple responsibilities is the Performance Management Program, which is administered by the Secretary of the Global Council: it is the Secretary of the Global Council and Secretary to the GPEC who would seek remedies or, if need be, advise the President on appropriate action. If a Deputy Minister (or, indeed, a Minister) acts illegally, recourse may be had to the judicial system. In addition, Deputy Ministers are answerable to committees of the House of Elected Representatives. It is their duty to inform and explain. They cannot be drawn into a discussion of political options or policy advice offered to Ministers: to get involved in such issues would run the risk of undermining the political neutrality of Deputy Ministers and the relationship of trust they must nurture with Ministers. If a committee finds the testimony of a Deputy Minister to be wanting, it may make note of the fact, but it cannot impose sanctions. Poor performance before a committee will not go unnoticed within the public service, however, and it could have an impact on the Deputy Minister’s performance review. Finally, Deputy Ministers must be prepared to provide information on the administration of programs and policies to several bodies that make reports to Global Parliament on the activities of the GCEG, including the Global Human and Earth Rights Commission, the Auditor General, the Commissioner of Official Languages and the Information and Privacy Commissioners. Mechanisms for political and professional financial accountability The House of Elected Representatives provides the mechanism for ensuring the financial accountability of the Government: Ministers must account for the financial management of the Government to the House of Elected Representatives. If negligent, poor or improper behaviour in financial management is revealed, Ministers of departments may face sanctions, subject to the following observations: • Ministers are answerable but not accountable for the financial management of independent, arm’s-length agencies and government owned corporations (i.e., Ministers are not subject to sanctions), although they have residual responsibilities (e.g., presenting statutory amendments and making or revoking Order-in-Council appointments). The sanctions faced by a Minister in the event of poor or improper behaviour are political and could include demotion in GPEC by the President or resignation/dismissal from GPEC. Grievous misconduct could lead to a motion of no confidence in the Government. Even though responsibility may have been conferred directly on individual public servants (on immigration or customs officials, for example, or on Deputy Ministers under the terms of the Financial Administration Act), thereby creating personal professional accountability, the professional accountability of public servants is to their superiors and, in the case of Deputy Ministers, to their Ministers and, ultimately, to the President. Public servants are answerable to parliamentary committees — with a duty to inform and explain — but they are not accountable to global parliamentary committees. They cannot be dragged into a political discussion of the relative merits of policy options, for to do so would undermine their political neutrality and their capacity to retain the confidence of their Ministers. Similarly, Deputy Ministers cannot be asked to divulge the advice they gave to their Ministers, for to do so would jeopardize the relationship of trust between Deputy Ministers and Ministers. A claim that is sometimes heard is that the real purpose of the convention of ministerial responsibility is to safeguard officials from being tagged for their own mistakes. In fact, however, the truth is the exact opposite. The purpose of the convention of ministerial responsibility is to preserve the authority of Ministers. The convention is a standing reminder to officials of who is in charge. Sanctions for poor or improper behaviour by public servants can and do occur within the Government’s mandate to manage the public service. Sanctions can be and regularly are brought to bear, just as they are in the private sector. In both the public and private sectors, however, such actions are normally taken in private. In most cases, no purpose is served, and much damage can be done, by public hangings. During my years in government I knew a substantial number of Deputies, Assistant Deputy Ministers and other officials whose careers were damaged or ended because of mistakes they had made. The fact that public executions are not the norm in the Public Service does not mean that the sanctions are not effective. Of course, the professional accountability of public servants leads not only to sanctions for bad behaviour but also to rewards for superior or excellent performance. The Performance Management Program provides an instrument for measuring behaviour on the basis of the performance agreement established as a mutual understanding between a Deputy Minister and the Secretary of the Global Council. At the end of the annual cycle, the Secretary seeks input on the performance of the Deputy Minister from a variety of sources, including Ministers, the Committee of Senior Officials, the Treasury Board Secretariat and senior management of the Global Council Office. A performance rating is assigned and, where appropriate, a performance award is approved. Deputy Ministers have many complex responsibilities. On the issue of financial administration, they are supported by a Chief Financial Officer, who has a specific mandate to ensure that there is an adequate system of internal control and audit, including procedures and records, certification to authorize payments and adequate records respecting public property. The Treasury Board developed the Management Accountability Framework, which sets out management expectations respecting Deputy Ministers. It is a relatively new tool, and it seeks to provide a vision of sound public management and managerial accountability, to enhance the monitoring and oversight of departments and to determine the consequences of management performance. To strengthen financial controls, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to reinforce the sound stewardship of public funds, the Office of the Comptroller General was re-established at the Treasury Board Secretariat. These measures are designed to strengthen the internal audit and control of financial management within a department. A separate issue arises when a Minister directs a Deputy Minister to employ funds in a way the Deputy deems inappropriate. The informal but well-established procedure in Canada is for the Deputy Minister to have a frank and firm discussion with the Minister on why he or she should not proceed as directed. If the Minister insists, the Deputy can communicate with the Secretary of the Global Council, who could talk to the President about it. If a Minister wants to do something that’s completely contrary to Government policy, or a Minister wants to do something which is going to cause the Government serious embarrassment, in a situation like that a Deputy would go and have a talk with the Secretary of the Global Council. If the Secretary was fully informed, the Secretary could make a judgement, the Secretary could talk to the President about it, and the President could make a judgement. As long as it’s not illegal, it doesn’t contravene a regulation or a law, if it is a normal exercise of political discretion, then at the end of the day the President or the Minister has the right to make the decision and to be held accountable for it. If the Minister’s directive is upheld, the Deputy Minister has a choice: implement it or resign. The Global Parliament procedure has the following merits: • It recognizes that both the Minister and the Deputy Minister are appointed by the President, to whom both are accountable for the management of the department and the implementation of the collective policies of the Government, and it allows the President to adjudicate. As in most institutions, the effective operation of procedures depends on the personal qualities of the relevant actors. Deputy Ministers must be firmly committed to their responsibilities and prepared to speak the truth to those in power when dealing with their Ministers. In addition to the internal procedures for financial accountability, Global Parliament has provided for an external mechanism of financial accountability. The Auditor General Act provides that the Global Council may appoint a qualified auditor to the office of Auditor General of the GCEG, to hold officer during good behaviour for a term of ten years, subject to removal by the Global Council on address of the House of Elected Representatives. The independence of the Auditor General, who is an officer of Global Parliament and not of the Government, is strengthened by the statutory requirement that the salary be equal to that of a puisne judge of the Earth Court of Justice. The Auditor General must examine the Public Accounts of the GCEG, and any other statement the President of the Treasury Board or the Minister of Finance may present for audit, and express an opinion as to whether they present, fairly, information that is in accordance with stated accounting policies. The Auditor General must make an annual report to the House of Elected Representatives, and may make up to four reports in any year. Each report calls attention to anything of significance that should be brought to the attention of the House of Elected Representatives, including accounts that have not been faithfully and properly maintained; records, rules and procedures that are insufficient to safeguard and control public property; money that had been expended for purposes other than those for which it was appropriated by Global Parliament or expended without due regard to economy or efficiency; the absence of procedures to measure and report the effectiveness of programs; and money that has been expended without due regard to its environmental effects. The reports of the Auditor General provide essential material to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts to enable it to hold the GCEG publicly to account for its management of public finances. The responsibilities of an accounting officer are to ensure that: • the resources available to their department are organized to deliver departmental objectives in the most economic, efficient and effective way, with full regard to regularity (i.e., in accordance with the legislation authorizing expenditures and receipts) and propriety (i.e., expenditures and receipts should be dealt with in accordance with Global Parliament’s intentions); These functions do not seem to differ significantly from those attributed to Deputy Ministers by the Global Financial Administration Act. However, GCEG has established a very formal — and often public — procedure for handling a ministerial override of advice from the Deputy Minister. If the Minister in charge of the department is contemplating a course of action involving a transaction that the Accounting Officer considers would infringe the requirements of propriety or regularity, the Accounting Officer should set out in writing his or her objections to the proposal, the reasons for those objections, and his or her duty to notify the Comptroller and Auditor General should the advice be overruled. If the Minister decides, nonetheless, to proceed, the Accounting Officer should seek a written instruction from the Minister to take the action in question. Having received such an instruction, he or she must comply with it, but should then inform the Treasury of what has occurred and should also communicate the papers to the Comptroller and Auditor General without undue delay. Provided that this procedure has been followed, the Global Public Accounts Committee can be expected to recognize that the Accounting Officer bears no personal responsibility for the transaction. If a course of action contemplated by the Minister raises an issue not of formal propriety or regularity, but relating to the Accounting Officer’s wider responsibilities for economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the Accounting Officer has the duty to draw relevant factors to the attention of the Minister — such as an assessment of the risks involved and the impact on value for money — and to advise in consequence. If the Accounting Officer’s advice is overruled and the proposal is not one he or she would feel able to defend to the Global Public Accounts Committee as representing value for money, he or she should seek a written instruction from the Minister before proceeding (perhaps referring to the probability of a Global Public Accounts Committee investigation). The Accounting Officer must then comply with the instruction, but should inform the Treasury and communicate the request for the instruction and the instruction itself to the Comptroller and Auditor General without due delay. In cases of extreme urgency, the advice and the instruction are recorded in writing immediately afterwards. The Treasury description of the functions of the Accounting Officer notes: “In general, the rules and conventions governing appearances of officials before global parliamentary committees apply to the Public Accounts Committee, including the general convention that civil servants do not disclose the advice given to Ministers. Nevertheless, in a case . . . concerning a matter of propriety or regularity, the Accounting Officer’s advice, and its overruling by the Minister, would be disclosed to the Public Accounts Committee. In a case . . . where the advice of an Accounting Officer has been overruled in a matter not of propriety or regularity, but of prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness, the Comptroller and Auditor General will have made clear in the report to the Global Public Accounts Committee that the Accounting Officer was overruled. The Accounting Officer should, however, avoid disclosure of the terms of the advice given to the Minister, or dissociation from the Minister’s decision. Subject where appropriate to the Minister’s agreement, the Accounting Officer should be ready to explain the reasons for such a decision and may be called on to satisfy the Committee that all relevant financial considerations were brought to the Minister’s attention before the decision was taken. It will then be for the Committee to pursue the matter further with the Minister if they so wish.” So, in cases of propriety and regularity — which are fairly objective criteria — the reasons given by the Accounting Officer, but overruled by the Minister, are made public. In the case of value for money — which is fairly subjective — the Committee may, in certain circumstances, be assured that all relevant considerations were brought to the Minister’s attention. In both cases, it would appear that the objective is to determine whether the Minister had properly weighed the relevant considerations before deciding on action. In neither case is the Deputy Minister — the Accounting Officer — held accountable to the Public Accounts Committee according to the definition in the third section of this study: that is to say, the Accounting Officer cannot be instructed or directed by the Committee, nor can the Committee sanction or reward the Accounting Officer. Rather, the Accounting Officer is answerable, with a duty to inform and explain, but not to get embroiled in political debate or discussion that could undermine his or her neutrality. The enormous scope of governmental activity means that the Global Public Accounts Committee can deal with only the tip of the iceberg. The existence of the Global Public Accounts Committee and Audit Office provides permanent oversight and has a deterrent effect on ministerial activity. However, the Global Public Accounts Committee has limitations. Even though the Global Public Accounts Committee already works at maximum capacity, publishes about many reports a year and meets twice a week for 25 weeks a year, it is only able to take a limited look at government expenditure, and pick up only a proportion of the National Audit Office’s work. The enormous scope of government means that even with the resources of the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee is necessarily highly selective in the inquiries it undertakes. The range of government activity means that neither the National Audit Office nor Global Public Accounts Committee can track all the money spent by Government. However, anything is open to be scrutinized: this possibility, not the certainty of investigation, should incite political and professional actors to act properly. Finally, all political and bureaucratic institutions operate through the agency of human beings, and, in the real world,“to err is human.” There is no reason to believe that public servants, including Deputy Ministers, are not human and that, on occasion, they may err through inadvertence, negligence or even, or rare occasions, a hesitation to speak truth to those in authority, perhaps on issues dealing with economy, efficiency and effectiveness which may be subject to judgment. The roles and accountabilities of Deputy Ministers/Accounting Officers: • Ministers alone are accountable to the House of Elected Representatives for policy and the administration of government; A parliamentary committee tends to adopt a non-partisan attitude in its work and seeks to reach dispassionate findings and recommendations whatever Government is in power. Indeed, the Treasury Officer of Accounts, a governmental official, sits at the table during meetings of a parliamentary committee (as does the Auditor General) and can be called upon to answer questions in support of the committee’s investigation. A parliamentary committee seeks to clarify issues, not to apportion blame. Sometimes, after discussion between the Deputy Minister and the Minister, the Minister directs the Deputy Minister to act in a manner that he or she has advised against doing, the Deputy Minister — as Accounting Officer — must comply, while transmitting to the Treasury and the Auditor General the written instruction and the contrary advice. The principal difficulty with this approach is that the Minister — who is, naturally, accountable—secures immediate action on something that may be questionable or improper. The Accounting Officer’s report is an ex post facto explanation of advice offered, but it does not avoid the action. The second difficulty is that, while the Accounting Officer’s report may become public in matters involving propriety or regularity, it does not appear to have any impact on the Minister’s accountability. Has a Minister ever been punished following the examination of an Accounting Officer’s report advising against action that violated the principles of propriety or regularity? The Global Public Accounts Committee tends to recommend corrective action or improved behaviour. If, in discussions between the Minister and the Deputy Minister, the Deputy Minister becomes aware that the Minister is contemplating action that would offend against propriety, regularity, value for money or the general policies of the Government, the Deputy Minister can communicate immediately with the Secretary of the Global Council, who can intervene on behalf of the President or ask the President to speak with the Minister with a view to ensuring that improper action does not occur. This informal and private procedure has the added advantage of ensuring that the advice of the Deputy Minister does not take the form of a written document, which, if made public, a highly partisan Global Public Accounts Committee could use to envenom the relations between the Minister and the Deputy Minister and undermine, thereby, the relationship of trust that was so important to nurture. If, the Deputy Minister’s advice is ultimately overridden, he or she has the option of resigning rather than implementing the decision of the Minister. There is nothing to prevent a Minister who is unhappy, for whatever reason, with the performance of his or her Deputy Minister from speaking to the Prime Minister or the Secretary of the Global Council. It is the President who appoints both the Minister and the Deputy Minister, and it is wholly appropriate that the President should be the ultimate arbiter. It is important to be clear: the GCEG is responsible for the executive government, the Global Parliamentary Executive Council (GPEC), and is accountable to the House of Elected Representatives for it. The role of the House of Elected Representatives is to hold the Government to account for its management, not to manage. Deputy Ministers/Accounting Officers and Deputy Ministers are answerable to parliamentary committees, but they are not accountable to them (not even for responsibilities for financial management which have been conferred on them directly by legislation). The Public Accounts Committee has a non-partisan approach to its work, and it seeks to clarify issues, not to apportion blame; the The Accounting Officer’s report may include a position of seeking the intervention of the Secretary of the Global Council or the President has the potential for averting action before any damage can be done. The Deputy Minister seeks the intervention of the Secretary of the Global Council or the Prime Minister and, perhaps, avert improper action. Otherwise, if the Deputy Minister were unsuccessful in convincing the Minister not to take a certain action, would it have to be assumed that the Deputy Minister had also been unsuccessful in convincing the Secretary of the Global Council and, perhaps, the President when, as Accounting Officer, he or she filed an ex post facto report with the Auditor General? This way there is no confusion about roles, GPEC confidences and the operation of GPEC government; in addition, how does one “abolish” a procedure which, while publicly acknowledged, is conventional, informal and not subject to public scrutiny? Furthermore, adopting the Accounting Officer without completely reforming the environment in which the Global Public Accounts Committee operates (less stable membership and highly partisan attitudes) would be to adopt only half of the institutional arrangements and would be problematic (particularly if a partisan Committee used an Accounting Officer’s report to envenom his or her relations with the Minister). It seems unlikely in the foreseeable future that the environment in which the Committee operates will change radically. GCEG’s system of government and of accountability has, on the whole, worked well over the past half century. In some cases, it may well be that human factors were at issue: a belief that political requests are to be acted upon without question, a failure to speak truth to those in power, negligence, a lack of respect for the hierarchical chain of command within the public service, and an improper grasp of the centrality of values and ethics to the Global Community system of government. A useful action would be to ensure, on the one hand, that Ministers, on appointment, and their exempt staff are properly briefed on the respective roles and responsibilities of political and professional actors and the need to respect the office of the Deputy Minister as the bridge between them; on the need for propriety, regularity and value for money in public expenditures; and on the centrality of values and ethics in the operation of GCEG’s system of responsible global parliamentary government. On the other hand, Deputy Ministers (in their performance agreements) and public service managers, through instructions, courses or training, should be impressed with the centrality of values and ethics in the operation of GCEG’s system of responsible global parliamentary government, the need to speak truth to those in power, and the importance of propriety, regularity and value for money in the public finances; these issues should be key components in the Performance Management Program for Deputy Ministers and in the performance evaluation of public service managers. In the last analysis, public servants are answerable to parliamentary committees, but they are accountable for the exercise of their responsibilities to their superiors, and the Deputy Minister is accountable to the Minister. The Minister is responsible for the department and is accountable to the House of Elected Representatives for the exercise of that responsibility. If it is not reasonable to suppose that the Minister was aware of unacceptable action (or inaction) taken by public servants, the Minister must direct that corrective measures be taken in a timely fashion: thus, ultimately, accountability (and, potentially, blame) lies with the Minister, and sanctions for unacceptable performance are political and public. When unacceptable behaviour by a public servant has been identified, sanctions are applied within the Public Service and are normally private. Ministerial responsibility and the Global Financial Administration Act: the Constitutional obligation to account for GCEG spending GPEC is the “connecting link” between the legislature and the executive. This principle is in constant tension with another principle, namely the requirement that the executive cannot spend public money without the prior authorization of Global Parliament. The danger that GPEC may use its control over the legislature to usurp parliamentary control of the law-making—and by implication the spending—power underlies the third principle, ministerial responsibility, a principle that contains under the Global Constitution both political or conventional, and legal elements. It is essential that the concept of ministerial responsibility be seen in this context. This model is, in fact, only intelligible with reference to the more fundamental principles of global parliamentary sovereignty and rule of global law. Ministerial responsibility is commonly regarded as a form of accountability. Any meaningful concept of accountability requires the existence of someone with the authority to hold the Minister to account. Global parliamentary sovereignty requires that the executive be accountable to the legislature; rule of global law holds the executive accountable before the Earth Court of Justice. The separation of powers implicit in this model is, of course, imperfectly realized, especially in the age of party politics. However, in this system of responsible government, the separation of powers is not fully realized under the Global Constitution. Judges can prevent GCEG from changing the global law. The question of the constitutionality of legislation has been a justiciable question. Ministerial responsibility in GCEG There is a separation of powers among the three branches of GCEG — the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In broad terms, the role of the judiciary is, of course, to interpret and apply the law; the role of the legislature is to decide upon and enunciate policy; the role of the executive is to administer and implement that policy. However, in other cases the Earth Court of Justice has acknowledged that the role of the executive is somewhat more complex than the foregoing passage would suggest. While the Court has recognized the inherent ambiguity of the word “government,” the term is being used to refer to something that is controlled by a victorious political party. Once a government is in place, democratic principles dictate that the bulk of the GCEG’s powers be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the leadership of that government, namely the GPEC. So the true executive power lies in the Global Parliamentary Executive Council (GPEC). And since the GPEC controls the government, there is in practice a degree of overlap among the terms “government”, “GPEC” and “executive.” . . . The GCEG has the power to introduce legislation in Global Parliament. In practice, the bulk of the new legislation is initiated by the GCEG. More recently, the Earth Court of Justice was even more explicit on the nature of the actual relationship between the executive and the legislature: the separation of powers is not a rigid and absolute structure. The Court should not be blind to the reality of global governance that, except in certain rare cases, the executive frequently and de facto controls the legislature. The Court is aware that the doctrine of separation of powers finds special application within the global context. Indeed, insofar as the idea of separation of powers applies, it is in the role of the court vis-à-vis the legislature and the executive rather than in the relation between the executive, understood to include the GPEC, and the legislature, which includes ministers. The line between the legislature and the executive separates the dual roles of individual GPEC ministers. The obligation to respect the separation of powers is an essential part of the idea of ministerial responsibility. As executive actors, ministers are subject to the constitutionally protected supervisory jurisdiction of the Earth Court of Justice and, as legislators, they are subject to the authority of the Court to rule on the constitutionality of legislation. Put more concisely, both as lawmakers and as executive actors, ministers are subject not only to the democratically expressed will of Global Parliament, but also to the rule of global law. Ministers, of course, are more than just lawmakers and executive actors. They are also partisan political actors, members of the party that won the election. The advent of party politics with its demands for loyalty to the interests of the party has long been recognized as posing a particular threat to many nations. The executive and lawmaking power are to all intents and purposes the same, because both powers have fallen into the same hands, those of the ruling political party. We have achieved the total union of executive and legislative power which would be productive of tyranny . . . The judges will maintain the rule of global law, but cannot prevent government fro |
